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IDEOLOGIES AND REVOLUTIONS

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Revolutions can have a tremendous impact on international politics for a variety of reasons, though this often has to do with the ideological change that occurs in the revolutionary state. In this chapter, I lay out why this is the case. I elaborate several pathways for how this ideological change can lead to conflict and cooperation with states. I then illustrate one of the main mechanisms by which revolutions can have an international effect – when it is feared that revolution can spread – by examining French policy toward revolutions in the 1770s and 1780s, when they did not consider the possibility that revolution could spread, and French policy toward revolutions in the 1820s, when that was at the forefront of their considerations. This example, and the other theories elaborated, point to the fact that the ideological change generated by revolutions have international effects in certain political contexts for particular political reasons. A change in the ideology legitimating a state does not necessarily generate an international response.

Definitions of Ideology and Revolutions

There are a variety of ways to define ideology. Political scientists interested in explaining the behavior of individuals, such as voting behavior, often define it as a belief system of a person that is relatively stable and coherent, which guides their behavior.¹ On a more macro level, ideology can be considered as a particular vision “for ordering *domestic* politics.”² In other words, an ideology can be a broad framework or set of principles that legitimates rule and denotes a particular ideological regime type. Monarchies, liberal democracies, communist or fascist states have different ideologies that justify the government’s right to rule.

Revolutions can change the ideology of a state in both these senses, which in turn can affect international relations. Revolutions replace the existing elite with a new set that inevitably has a different belief system, although whether that worldview differs materially on matters of foreign policy may or may not be the case. Revolutions, though, are inherently a change in ideology in the more macro sense – the ideology that legitimates rule in a regime. While there are considerable differences over how to define “revolution,” Jack Goldstone’s definition captures the basic elements of how the term is commonly used: Revolutions are “an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal

or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities.”³ This definition introduces four elements, two involving the means (the mass mobilization and the noninstitutionalized action) and two involving outcome – the undermining of existing authorities and the new way of justifying political authority. Scholars focused on causes of revolution often define revolution in terms of a particular process.⁴ But in the way the term is used more broadly, the outcome is just as, if not more, important, namely that we have a new regime with a different ideology legitimating rule. The ideological change is inherent in what a revolution is, and contrasts it with other forms of regime change.

How Revolutions Affect International Politics

Revolutions can change patterns of conflict and cooperation among states. Most of the focus has been on how revolutions worsen relations between revolutionary states and other states, including the outbreak of war. There are different pathways by which this can occur, and it commonly involves the ideological change that occurs with a revolution. There are four main reasons why the ideological change caused by revolutions can cause interstate conflict: revolutions can bring to power revolutionaries that have expansionist aims; they can prompt revolutionary contagion, where leaders fear or hope for the spread of revolution to other states; they can lead to misperceptions of intentions as the ideological differences between the sides leads to a spiral of hostility; and the domestic struggle for power – revolutionaries’ desire to consolidate their ideological vision domestically – can prompt revolutionaries to lash out at other states.⁵

Revolutions can lead to the replacement of elites with those that have more aggressive aims.⁶ “Aggressive aims” is a nebulous term, but two particular aggressive aims that prompt hostility are the aims to spread one’s revolution to other states and to expand the borders of the revolutionary state. These goals could be complimentary, but need not be. Revolutionaries may want to spread the revolution without expanding the borders of the revolutionary state, or be more interested in spreading their borders than spreading revolution.

Perhaps the best example of the latter is the fascist revolutions in Italy and Germany. The expansionist foreign policies of Mussolini and Hitler were integral to the fascist revolution. These fascist powers to some extent wanted to spread their regime type – Italy more so than Germany. But the fascist revolution in foreign policy was more about Italians and Germans dominating non-Italians and non-Germans. There were certainly aspects of revisionist continuity between liberal and Fascist Italy and Weimar and Nazi Germany, but the aims of the fascist powers were considerably greater than previous revisionism.⁷ These fascist revolutions eventually led to the Second World War.

Another example of a revolution threatening states by promising to expand the revolutionary state’s borders, although by different means, is the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. The pan-Arabist ideology that underwrote that revolution held that the Arab nation had been needlessly divided into separate states by colonial powers intent on keeping them weak. There should be one Arab state, presumably with Egypt at the core. Rather than expanding via armed invasion, the revolutionary state could expand by publics demanding that their state be incorporated in the larger Arab state with Egypt at its core.⁸

The aim of many revolutionary leaders is to spread their ideology – to export their revolution.⁹ The hope – or fear – of a particular ideological regime type spreading is a main reason for conflict between states of different ideological types, which can be the consequence of revolutions. Monarchies may clash with democratic revolutions, democracies could clash with communist revolutions, and so on. Revolutionaries could have several motives to spread their

type. It may be out of missionary altruism, or it may be because of the need for self-preservation. As Trotsky said, “either the Russian Revolution will create a revolutionary movement in Europe, or the European powers will destroy the Russian Revolution!”¹⁰ In other words, there may be the notion that if the revolutionary movement does not spread, the revolution will be crushed by the counterrevolutionaries.

Counterrevolutionaries may also have several motives. They may want to prevent the spread of a revolutionary movement because they fear that revolution will spread to their own polity. Counterrevolutionary states may fear revolutionary states invading them to impose revolution, or, more indirectly, the revolutionary state may practice subversion by aiding and abetting revolutionary movements in the counterrevolutionary state. But fears of contagion are not necessarily contingent on the actions of the revolutionary state. In other words, it does not require the aggressive actions or even aims of revolutionary leaders to spread revolution in order to prompt hostility and conflict. Counterrevolutionaries can fear that the mere existence of the revolutionary state can trigger contagion. Counterrevolutionaries may also fear the geopolitical effects of other states succumbing to an alternative ideology, regardless of whether they fear the contagion will reach their own shores. For example, during the Cold War, the United States was as keen on crushing communist revolutions as was Soviet Union regarding democratic revolutions. They did not want their ideological rival to have a new ally, which they assumed would be inevitable if there was an ideological switch caused by a revolution.

Misperceptions of the intentions of others are another pathway by which revolutions (and their associated ideological change) can lead to conflict between states that are ideologically different.¹¹ In contrast to the sources of conflict just discussed, the problem is not a genuine conflict of interest, whereby one side or the other or both want to crush their ideological rival, or the revolutionary state wants to expand at the expense of other powers. Instead, there is a spiral of suspicion, whereby leaders that have benign intent cannot effectively communicate that because they are viewed through the prism of a rival ideology that assumes their hostility. These ideological security dilemmas create conflict without any fundamental clash of interests. This is one interpretation of the outbreak of conflict between France and Austria/Prussia, which began the French Revolutionary Wars.¹²

Another reason revolutions can lead to conflict does not so much involve the ideological conflict between the revolutionary state and its potential rivals, but the domestic ideological dispute going on within the revolutionary state. Revolutions are a process, and the overthrow, or partial overthrow, of the old order is just the beginning of the jockeying for power. Sometimes the dispute between these ideological factions spills out into foreign affairs because these groups have affiliations with foreign powers, and domestic factions can see conflict with an international power as a means to gain supremacy in their domestic struggle, particularly by tying those rivals to a hostile foreign power. For example, the Girondins/Brissotins during the French Revolution thought initiating a war with the hated Austrians in particular would allow them to marginalize the monarchy and consolidate the revolution.¹³ Likewise, in many third world revolutions during the Cold War, the radical group would initiate hostility with the United States as a means to sideline their liberal rivals.¹⁴ For example, it is argued that the Sandinistas in Nicaragua generated conflict with the United States as a means to discredit their liberal rivals and consolidate their revolution.¹⁵ Or the revolutionaries may want to use foreign crises as a means to mobilize the population for radical schemes. For example, scholars have argued that Mao initiated the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 as a means to help achieve the Great Leap Forward.¹⁶

These four main reasons why the ideological change caused by revolutions can cause interstate conflict – expansionist revolutionary states, revolutionary contagion, misperceptions, and domestic politics – are not exhaustive.¹⁷ Nor are they mutually exclusive categories. In fact, all four have been applied to the singular case of the origins of the French Revolutionary Wars.¹⁸ But there is a basic contradiction between the view that ideological distances are causing misperception of hostile intent when there is none, versus the view that conflict is generated by the hostility of the revolutionary state, the counterrevolutionary state, or both. And it seems as though when there is friction between the revolutionary state and its rivals, it is usually because there is a genuine conflict of interest.

Much of the focus of the scholarly literature on the international effects of revolutions has been on how revolutions can lead to interstate conflict. But revolutions can also lead to increased cooperation, among counterrevolutionaries against the revolutionary state, but also between the revolutionary state and other states, if those states approve of the ideological change caused by the revolution. For example, the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 drew those states closer to Western Europe. The revolution in Cuba obviously led to a deterioration of relations with the United States, but it improved relations with the Soviets.

This raises the larger issue of why similar ideological systems might ally with each other. One motive is that similar states have interests in preserving their similar domestic political system, and alliances or alignments can be tools to further that goal. There are several reasons why states would find allying with similar regimes may aid that end. Similar states might face the same threats to their political system by an ideological rival. These states may bind together to contain the spread of an ideology that they fear will impact their domestic political system. States may join alliances with similar regimes because they know that the alliance partners will support their regime against internal or external enemies. This is not a new phenomenon. In Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War, Athens often intervened to impose or support democratic governments. While it tolerated some oligarchies, it generally preferred democracies as allies because "by and large, Athens could count on the support of the lower classes and the hostility of the wealthy and aristocratic families."¹⁹ For many of these reasons, scholars of foreign imposed regime change have noted that those imposing the regime often prefer their own type.²⁰

There is, then, not one way that revolutions can affect international politics owing to a revolution's ideological effect. It can lead to conflict or cooperation through a variety of paths. Revolutions can also have an international effect independent of the ideological changes. Revolutions often change the power of the revolutionary state, which can have international effects on its own. The domestic chaos involved in a revolution, as existing elites are overturned, the army is purged, the economy is weakened, and so forth, at least temporarily reduces the power of the revolutionary state. One effect this can have is taking the revolutionary state out of international politics for the moment. Given internal concerns, leaders are unable or unwilling to focus their attention abroad. This was the immediate effect of the French Revolution, allowing Britain to get their way against Spain in a colonial dispute without fear of a French reaction. More importantly, the Russian Revolution took Russia out of the First World War. The weakening of the revolutionary state has also occasionally prompted opportunistic wars, where neighboring states looking to increase their territorial holdings take a bite out of weak revolutionary states.²¹ This was the case when Somalia took advantage of the Ethiopian Revolution in 1977 to capture the Ogaden region.²² Nevertheless, when a revolution has international effects, changing patterns of conflict and cooperation, it often has something to do with the ideological change that has happened as a result of the revolution.²³

When Revolutions Affect International Politics

When do revolutions, which bring about different ideological types, and potentially leaders with different foreign policy views, have international effects? The first thing to establish is that there is variation. Stephen Walt argues revolutions always cause war or at least increase the security competition between states and Fred Halliday claims “it is an almost universal generalization that revolutions lead to wars.”²⁴ But, as discussed, sometimes revolutions will lead to conflict, and sometimes it will lead to cooperation. Sometimes it will improve relations with some states, and worsen relations with other states. And some revolutions do not have much of an international effect at all, such as the 1986 “People Power” revolution in the Philippines.

Because the ideological changes associated with revolutions often account for their international effects, why revolutions sometimes have a big international effect and sometimes do not raises the larger question of when ideological differences between states (meaning states that are organized or legitimized under different principles) matter for international politics and sometimes do not. States with ideological differences sometimes conflict and sometimes do not. What does it depend on? There is no single answer to this, for several reasons. First, there are multiple pathways by which revolutions can have an international effect. Each theory has its scope conditions. For example, the theory that posits revolutionaries will lash out at other states that have ties with their domestic ideological rivals assumes those conditions, which is not the case with every revolution. In addition, sometimes theories need more scope conditions. Moreover, even given certain scope conditions, a theory might not make the correct prediction because it is probabilistic. Idiosyncratic contextual factors may matter. Just as wars of opportunism do not break out whenever a revolution causes a weakening of the revolutionary state, the ideological changes that are inherent in revolutions do not inherently invoke the pathways to conflict and cooperation mentioned.

Although there are many pathways by which revolutions have an international effect, I have stated that one of the main ways is when they are perceived as a larger transnational struggle over the nature of regimes and whether a particular type is spreading. Thus, determining when this is the case helps us understand when ideological changes that happen as a result of revolution will become salient for international politics. The first step in this determination is whether revolutions have transnational appeal. Many revolutions are associated with ideologies that have transnational appeal. This is the case with ideologies that purport to be universal, such as liberal democracy or communism. Other ideologies might have more limited but still transnational claims. Political Islam targets at least the Islamic ummah. Those nationalist revolutions that are largely confined to the borders of the state in which it occurred, as was the case with the Mexican and Turkish revolutions, did not have a broader ideological effect. But if the nation is spread across multiple states, as is the case in the Arab world, revolution has the potential to spread, too, as was manifested in the Egyptian Revolution of 1952.

The fact that an ideology has potential transborder appeal, though, does not necessarily mean that it will, or that political leaders will be alarmed at this possibility. In my own work, I argue that it is only when leaders have a significant revolutionary movement at home that is the same character as the revolutionary state that they fear revolutionary contagion to their own polity. This, in turn, drives them to be hostile toward the revolutionary state, and cooperative with states that have such contagion concerns.²⁵ I illustrate this argument below by contrasting French policy toward revolutions in two periods – during the ancien regime, just prior to the French Revolution, and in the 1820s in the aftermath of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In the former era, ideological factors were not salient for international

politics. In the latter period, they were. This example shows how revolutions that have ideological effects sometimes have international effects because of those ideological changes, and sometimes do not, and what that turns on.

French Policy Toward Revolutions During the Ancien Regime and the Restoration

The two most notable democratic revolutions prior to the French Revolution itself was the American Revolution from 1775 to 1783 and the Dutch Patriot Revolt from around 1783 to 1787. Curiously, the oldest monarchy in Europe, France, aided both these democratic revolutions. The case of the American Revolution is well known. France viewed the Revolution as an opportunity to get back at their geopolitical rival who had dealt them a humiliating loss in the Seven Years War. Separating the colonies from England, it was thought under mercantilist assumptions, would be a blow to British power. They covertly aided the American revolutionaries beginning in 1776 and openly allied with them in 1778 – when it was clear that the Americans were committed to independence but could not win without support. France (and Spain's) direct military intervention in the war was critical in securing an American victory.

The case of the Dutch Patriot Revolt is less well known, in part because it was ultimately unsuccessful. This revolt, inspired by the American Revolution, was a democratic revolution on the doorstep of France. The Dutch Republic was ruled by the stadholder, a pseudo-monarchical position, who faced pushback from the regents, the urban oligarchs. The Patriot Revolt developed into a civil conflict and a much more radical critique of the stadholder – a democratic revolution. This revolution had clear geopolitical implications. The Netherlands was traditionally in the British sphere of influence, and the British were tied to the stadholder. The Patriots reached out to the French for an alliance. Like in the American Revolution, France had the opportunity to side with the democrats to wrest a state from the British sphere of influence into theirs, and they took it. The French tied their policy to the Patriots, who continued to gain in power vis-à-vis the stadholder, who was being aided by Britain. In 1787, however, the Patriots overplayed their hand by capturing and temporarily detaining the stadholder's wife, the Princess, who was also the niece of Prussian king Frederick William. The British supported a Prussian invasion to restore the power of the stadholder. Britain and Prussia only acted when they were confident that France would stand aside, given her domestic troubles, troubles that would lead to the French Revolution.

In both these cases, the French intervened on the side of the radical democrats to secure geopolitical aims. And in both cases, there was some hesitation by French king Louis XVI towards getting involved in such ventures. But this was not because he feared that aiding such democratic revolutions would lead to the revolutionary ideology spreading to France.²⁶ The extent of his ideological concerns was that his own agents tone down their revolutionary rhetoric.²⁷ He wondered about the reliability of a democratic ally, given their instability. But this concern did not cause him to abandon the Americans, and the reason he abandoned the Dutch Patriots was not because of their ideology. It was because of the economic crisis in France that would precipitate the French Revolution.

Why did the King and the French leadership in general not have contagion concerns, a worry that aiding revolutionaries abroad would embolden revolutionaries at home? After all, both the American Revolution and the Dutch Patriot Revolt would inspire the revolutionaries in France a few years hence.²⁸ The simple reason was that there were no revolutionaries at home. As one scholar states, it was the French Revolution that made revolutionaries in France,

not the other way around.²⁹ Even a Frenchman who was a keen advocate of the American Revolution would say “The liberty for which I am going to fight inspires in me great enthusiasm, and I would like my own country to possess as much of it as is compatible with our monarchy, our status, and our customs.”³⁰ There was a level of discontent with the monarchy, but almost no one was advocating the overthrow of the monarchy. Because of this, contagion concerns were too abstract.

Fast-forward to 1820, and the domestic situation in France was much different. The Bourbons had been restored by the great powers, but they had a host of domestic enemies – liberals, republicans, and Bonapartists. The monarchy had been overthrown by these groups in 1814 and the great powers had to reinstate them. Revolutionaries actively consorted against the monarchy. Most notably, in February 1820, a Bonapartist assassinated the only Bourbon considered likely to produce an heir to the throne. In short, there was a robust revolutionary opposition to the monarchy in 1820 where there was not in 1780.

Likewise, the contrast between French policy towards the democratic revolutions in the ancien regime and their policy towards revolutions beginning in 1820 could not be more striking. In that year, there was the beginning of a wave of revolutions, starting in Spain and continuing in Portugal, Naples, Piedmont-Sardinia, and Greece. The revolutions in Italy in particular promised France with a similar opportunity as they had in the 1770s and 1780s – side with revolutionaries for geopolitical gain. With the defeat of Napoleon, France had been kicked out of the Italian peninsula, which was now in the Austrian sphere of influence. The French policy could have been what it had been in the past – side with the revolutionaries to wrest a territory from a rival’s sphere of influence. They had even more of a case to make with these territories, since they had previously been in control of them. Piedmont was in the French sphere of influence prior to the French Revolution, and then it was annexed by France. Naples was also conquered by France, which had its proxies placed on the throne. Some French diplomats were encouraging precisely this policy even before the revolutions broke out.³¹ This is what Klemens von Metternich, the architect of Austrian foreign policy, feared.

Metternich’s fears, however, were misplaced. After the first Italian revolution (in Naples), Prime Minister Richelieu immediately promised to Metternich that he could “count on us that we will do all in our power to prevent the evils that no one more than us has to fear.”³² Some French diplomats argued that they could attempt to steer the revolutions in a more moderate direction and have them adopt something similar to the French charter. But French leaders thought even that was too risky. They foreswore opportunities to expand their influence. French foreign minister Pasquier, who was particularly worried about Austrian domination of Italy, more so than Richelieu, stated to one of his diplomats that there is no doubt that if France wanted she could take up the banner of liberalism and these constitutional regimes would swing from Austrian to French influence. But it was clear that was no longer possible, and it was clear why it was not possible: In other circumstances we could have done this but, he said, “today she would expose herself to the danger, immense for herself and for Europe, of encouraging, against her will, the spirit of revolution.”³³ They wanted revolutions crushed, and they would accept Austrian hegemony if it served that aim. Why they were concerned about emboldening revolutionaries, even at the expense of geopolitical gain, in contrast to French policy in the 1770s and 1780s, had to do with their domestic situation. The possibility of revolutionary contagion to France during the ancien regime was abstract and distant, given that there were essentially no revolutionaries in France advocating and organizing to overthrow the monarchy. In 1820s France, this was no longer the case.

Although for reasons of space I have focused on France, the other great powers had the same approach towards revolutions in these respective periods. They largely ignored the ideology

of the American Revolution and Dutch Patriot Revolt. Their policy was driven by geopolitical concerns. In the 1820s, however, the possibility of revolutionary contagion was front and center. It dominated how states responded to revolutions, and how they treated each other. For example, Russian restraint in the affairs of Europe in the nineteenth century – one of the biggest puzzles in the geopolitics of the era – and their oftentimes grouping with autocratic Austria despite the geopolitical tensions is in large part due to the concerns of the ideological threat of alternative options.

Conclusion

Revolutions usually have a significant international effect, and often, though not always, this has to do with the ideological change that happens as a result of the revolution. Ideological changes can alter patterns of cooperation and conflict through a variety of ways. I have outlined four main pathways that revolutions prompt conflict with other states, which is the main focus of the international effects of revolutions: anticipation of revolutionary contagion, the expansion of the revolutionary state, misperceptions, and revolutionary states lashing out at others as a product of their domestic struggle. Revolutions can prompt cooperation for a variety of reasons as well. For this reason, there is no single explanation for when revolutions will have international effects and when they will not. I have elaborated, though, when leaders will fear revolutionary contagion domestically. Leaders fear that revolution will spread to their own polity when they have significant revolutionary movements of the same character as the revolutionary state, irrespective of whether there is a policy of the revolutionary state to export revolution. Under these conditions, there will be a tendency for hostility towards the revolutionary state and cooperation with states that have the same contagion concerns.

We see these contagion dynamics operating in contemporary international politics. For example, contagion concerns are integral to explaining Saudi policy toward revolutions in the Arab Spring, as well as Russian policy toward revolutions on its western flank. These cases also illustrate how ideological concerns interact with other geopolitical concerns. In the case of French policy in the 1820s above, contagion concerns overrode a geopolitical interest France had in siding with revolutionaries in Italy. Sometimes contagion concerns coincide with geopolitical interests. The Saudis wanted to crush revolution in Bahrain in 2011 both to discourage revolutionary contagion and to prevent expanding Iranian influence, because it was assumed that the Shia majority that would come to power in Bahrain if a democracy was established would tilt toward Iran. Vladimir Putin had an interest in stemming revolution in Ukraine in 2014 not only because he disliked the foreign policy consequences of a Ukraine that was pro-Western. He also detested a similar quasi-dictator being toppled by a revolutionary movement, after there had been unprecedented protests against the Kremlin from 2011 to 2013. And in 2022, with Ukraine emerging as more democratic, he attempted to replace the regime. His efforts to stem revolution in Belarus in 2020–21 were more successful. For Putin, it is not only, or even primarily, intolerable for these states to lean to the West because of the geopolitical threat; these states becoming genuine democracies pose a domestic threat – a negative example for his people. Sometimes contagion concerns push against a state's geopolitical interests, as evinced in the French case, and the result is more complicated. The Saudis, for example, have a geopolitical interest in seeing the revolution in Syria against Bashar al-Assad succeed, because it would remove a key Iranian ally in the region. But an Islamist revolution in Syria could embolden the same forces that threaten the Saudi monarchy. This tension has coexisted in Saudi policy. They have supported rebels while trying to make sure that the right rebels come to power.

Whether revolutions will change patterns of cooperation and conflict because of the ideological change they produce varies depending on the conditions of the theories outlined above, and how they interact with other competing factors. Sometimes whether revolutions and their consequent ideological effects will have international effects depends on the larger political/ideological context in which they take place. The potency of ideological movements waxes and wanes. There was a period in Middle Eastern history, for example, where secular Arab nationalism was in the ascendancy and regarded as a serious threat to rival states, but that was followed by a period when this ideology was in the decline and not regarded as serious a threat as the ideology of political Islam, which was ascendant.³⁴

These contextual factors matter, because revolutions often have a large international effect, not because of an abstract psychological or sociological mechanism by which unlike types repel and vice-versa. There are many instances of states with opposing ideologies cooperating and vice versa. In fact, occasionally the conflict generated by a revolution is because of ideological similarities. Revolutions in some cases created states that vie for the mantle of revolutionary vanguard with other revolutionary states, or disagree over the aims or means of their ideological program, like the Iraqi-Syrian rivalry or the Sino-Soviet rivalry.³⁵ Revolutions can have a large international effect by the ideological change they generate for political reasons, in particular political contexts.

Some have argued that revolutionary states quickly abandon ideological aims given the pressures of the international system.³⁶ That is often not the case.³⁷ But neither are revolutionary states destined to have certain international effects as long as there are ideological differences between that state and others. The political context and the mechanism causing conflict or cooperation matter. The fear of revolutionary contagion, for example, can dissipate as potential counterrevolutionaries stabilize their societies and revolutionary states prove to be an unattractive model.

Because ideological differences between states do not always matter for international politics, this factor often is ignored in the study of international relations. The international relations literature that focuses on regime types almost exclusively does so in terms of democratic and autocratic regimes and ignores the ideological differences between states. This, however, misses much of the richness of how, in certain periods and places, for particular reasons, the ideological changes brought about by revolutions have had potent international effects.

Notes

1 See, e.g., Jost 2006, 653.

2 Haas 2005, 5.

3 Goldstone 2001, 142.

4 Social scientists often have idiosyncratic definitions for their theoretical purposes. Definitions range from Charles Tilly's broad definition:

a forcible transfer of power over a state in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state, and some significant portion of the population subject to the state's jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each block

(Tilly 1996, 8)

to Theda Skocpol's narrow one: "rapid basic transformations of a society's state and class structures... accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below" (Skocpol 1979, 4). Many events that typically are not labeled as a revolution – any civil war – would be considered so under Tilly's definition, while many events that are usually considered a revolution would not qualify under Skocpol's definition, especially if one interprets a "basic transformation" narrowly. These definitions noticeably lack any ideological content.

- 5 These pathways are prominent in the literature, as cited below.
- 6 Colgan argues revolutions bring to power leaders that are risk acceptant by virtue of being revolutionaries, which need not involve ideology but leaders' psychological disposition. But he also adds that these leaders have political ambition to alter the status quo, which could involve ideology. Colgan 2013.
- 7 While it turns out that Gustav Stresemann, the architect of Weimar foreign policy, was not a "good European" in the sense that he had the aim of breaking Germany out of the "shackles" of Versailles (Gatzke 1954), he certainly did not have the expansive aims of *Lebensraum* that Hitler did, even before coming to power. Likewise, "whereas Sonnino [the liberal Italian foreign minister] set definite limits to Italian expansion, defined by the Pact of London, Mussolini had no set program, only boundless ambitions." (Burgwyn, 319). The expansionist aims of these fascists were present before Italy or Germany expanded their military capabilities, and are not merely the consequence of increasing capabilities. Indeed, they are the cause of increasing capabilities. On Mussolini's early revisionist aims, see Cassels 1970. On the impact of ideology on the expansionist aims of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, see Knox 2000.
- 8 For the classic account of this, see Kerr 1971.
- 9 See, e.g., Halliday 1999, 59–62.
- 10 Reed 1919, 143.
- 11 Haas 2005; Walt 1996.
- 12 See Walt 1996, 73; Kim 1970.
- 13 See, e.g., Blanning 1986, 123; Sybel 1867, 371–404.
- 14 Snyder 1999.
- 15 Hager Jr. and Snyder 2015.
- 16 Christensen 1996, ch. 6; Chen 2001, ch. 7.
- 17 For example, another occasional path to conflict is that revolutions create states that eventually conflict with others in their same ideological camp over points of ideology, like the Sino-Soviet rivalry, or the Iraqi-Syrian rivalry, as I mention below.
- 18 The origin of the French Revolutionary Wars is somewhat equivalent to the status of World War I in the larger field of international security. The general theories about why revolutions lead to war all seem to have a claim on this particular conflict, and it has been the basis of scholars' general theories. This is despite the fact that the case is idiosyncratic in several ways. Most importantly, the revolution happened in the largest state in the system, which invaded surrounding great powers.
- 19 Thucydides 1972, 611. It seems as though the same was true in reverse with Sparta and the oligarchs.
- 20 Owen 2010, 21. Seva Gunitsky argues this is especially the case in the aftermath of a hegemonic shock. Gunitsky 2014, 15.
- 21 This is emphasized in Ewenstein 2020.
- 22 Tareke 2000.
- 23 For example, even a case that is paradigmatic for the opportunism thesis, the origins of the Iran-Iraq war, I argue elsewhere it was not driven by changes in the distribution of capabilities but rather because of the fear of revolution spreading. Nelson 2018.
- 24 Walt 1996, 44; Halliday 1999, 241.
- 25 Nelson forthcoming.
- 26 There is some evidence of this type of hesitation from others. When the French foreign minister asked a diplomat to write a legal justification for the alliance with the Americans, he instead questioned the wisdom of France aiding the democrats: "Would it be proper to put into the mouth of a King of France or his minister paradoxical assertions concerning *natural liberty, inalienable and inadmissible rights of the people and its inherent sovereignty*, which have not ceased to be repeated, commented, ransacked, and compiled for two centuries, from François Hottoman's *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* to J.J. Rousseau's *Contrat social*? Would it be prudent even? ... If the King, if the government, appeared to profess such maxims, would we ourselves be exactly safe from their application and from their being turned against us?" Fay 1927, 483–84.
- 27 Corwin 1916, 8, ft. 11a; Witt 1886, 186.
- 28 Appleby 1971; Popkin 1995.
- 29 Doyle 1988, 213.
- 30 Fohlen 1976, 225.
- 31 Cuarto, 1972, 234; Spellanzon 1933, 843; Kozlovski 1997, 99; Bertier de Sauvigny 1970, 481.
- 32 Bertier de Sauvigny 1958, 94–95.
- 33 Bertier de Sauvigny 1970, 365.

- 34 See, for example, Nahas 1985. For an examination of the situation when there are multiple ideological enemies that states face, see Haas 2022.
- 35 Lorenz Lüthi argues for the importance of ideology in explaining the Sino-Soviet Split. Lüthi 2008. For the Iraqi-Syrian rivalry, see Kienle 1990.
- 36 Waltz 1979, 128.
- 37 For a more complicated picture, see Armstrong 1993.

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