Is Immigration Dividing US Labor?

Brian Burgoon
University of Amsterdam

Wade Jacoby
Brigham Young University

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Abstract:

How has immigration affected US union membership, bargaining, and strategies towards immigration? We focus on an “recruitment-representation” trade off. On one hand, union want to protect current members from wage competition from immigrant labor. On the other, they want to organize as much of the labor market as possible – including immigrants. Using data on foreign-born shares of employment, union membership and wage premiums, combined with individual data on worker attitudes, we demonstrate that the trade off is real but may be less severe than many fear. Although higher foreign-born shares of occupational employment are indeed associated with lower union density, they are also highest in the fastest growing segments of the economy and in the occupations with the fastest-growing shares of total union membership. Moreover, changes in foreign-born shares of occupation-segment employment do not correlate significantly with changes in union density or with levels or changes in union wage premiums. We also show that differences in union strategies can be largely explained by variations in foreign-born shares of employment and union membership. Aggregate, occupational- and union-specific data reveal that pro-immigration unions that were organizing immigrants tended to grow more and became a larger share of the AFL-CIO membership than those unions who opposed immigration. And continued divergence among unions, where Change-to-Win unions have higher and faster-growing foreign-born shares than most of the labor movement, underlies continued division in the labor movement.
How should American unions deal with immigration? Big increases in immigration into the United States, particularly in the share of low-education immigrants, have sparked considerable controversy among unions and scholars about how immigration affects union interests. This controversy has been particularly visible with relatively recent changes in union strategies at the level of national federations. The 1990’s was marked by sharp conflict among AFL-CIO unions over the propriety of tight immigration laws and the priority of organizing recent immigrants, culminating in the 1999 reversal of its long-time opposition to lax immigration laws and tepid or hostile stance towards immigrants.

The reasons for scholarly and “real life” controversy over unions and immigration has to do with a difficult-to-gauge trade off between the potential of immigrant workers to revive union membership rolls versus the potential for continued immigration to undermine the power of unions to serve incumbent members. Foreign-born citizens have become a bigger part of the labor force, are likely to become more so, and are thought by many to be as or more “organizable” than their native counterparts – making immigrants the future of labor movement membership. But immigrants also increase labor market supply, making them potential threats to the effective bargaining representation of existing union members, especially if immigrants are illegal and thus vulnerable to employer intimidation. Union leaders face a trade off, thus, between embracing immigration to increase union rolls and opposing immigration to improve representation of incumbent members. This trade off – what we call the “recruitment-representation trade off” – complicates finding out how unions can best deal with immigration to solidify and improve their place in industrial relations.

Existing scholarship tells us too little about the depth of such a trade off. It lacks direct and systematic attention to how immigration trends might be associated with developments in union membership, density, and wage premiums. And the literature tells us even less about variations over time and across unions in the depth of the trade off that might explain differences and changes in union strategies towards immigrants. This paper reports on research that can help fill these silences.
The paper first clarifies how immigration affects unions by finding measures of the depth of the trade-offs, specifically measures of how much immigration might provide a growing proportion of potential and actual union membership, versus how much immigration might undermine effective representation of existing members. Both descriptive and inferential statistics reveal how variation across time and occupation-segment in foreign-born workers relates to total employment, union density, union membership, and union wage premiums.

Both kinds of statistics tell a similar story: the recruitment-representation trade off, although real, may not be as sharp as many fear. Aggregate and occupational-level trends do suggest that foreign-born union density is declining faster than that of natives and that foreign-born shares of occupational employment are associated with the lowest union density. But the same data also suggest that foreign-born shares of employment tend to be in the fastest growing segments of the economy and in occupations with the fastest growing shares of total union membership. Moreover, changes in foreign-born shares of occupation-employment tend not to correlate significantly with changes in union density, and neither levels nor changes in such shares correlate significantly with union wage premiums across occupations. Altogether, these data suggest that as far as the recruitment-representation trade off of immigration is concerned, the membership benefits are clear and significant, the representation costs less so.

The paper also considers what variations in the trade-offs immigration poses for unions tell us about union strategies. Significant rifts in the labor movement on issues of immigration have their roots in the depth of the above trade-offs for particular unions at particular times. Significant rises in the foreign-born share of the labor force and of union membership reveal how important immigrants are to real and potential membership, whatever the down-side for incumbent union members. Similarly, occupations with faster-growing foreign-born employment have been marked by higher growth in employment and share of total union membership than occupations with lower foreign-born employment. Those unions focused on organizing foreign-born workers and on sectors where
such workers are a high proportion of total employment have tended to experience more membership
growth and rising shares of total union membership. These are the unions most supportive of
federation-level support of immigrants and looser immigration laws (e.g. amnesties and temporary
worker programs), helping to explain why the AFL-CIO reversed its long-time neglect of or hostility
towards immigrant workers by 2000. Less obviously, continued division in foreign-born shares of
targeted workers and union membership and the strategies they induce help make sense of the recent
break-away from the AFL-CIO of the seven “Change to Win” unions in summer 2005. We argue
that the split partly reflects, and in any event manifests, continued contention on immigration issues,
leaving the union movement more explicitly divided on immigration than before the split.

To develop these arguments, we sketch the union experience with immigration and critique
what existing scholarship tells us about that experience. We underline insufficient attention to both
the offsetting effects of immigration for union recruitment and representation and for unions’
immigration strategies. The second section presents new empirical research revealing the offsetting
effects of immigration for unions, based on the data on employment, union membership and wage
premiums. And the third section considers how the trends in foreign-shares in employment and
union membership underlie big changes in and enduring conflicts among union policies on issues of
immigration and immigrant organizing.

1. The Puzzle: Immigration, Unions and Union Strategies

Until quite recently, labor’s stance towards immigration was simple: unions championed
restrictive immigration laws and rarely prioritized organizing immigrants. In the mid-19th century,
unions sought to restrict new immigration, often through explicit nativist appeals (Briggs 2001). In
the early 20th century, the AFL craft unions pushed for literacy tests to discourage the poorest, least-
skilled immigrants. And both craft and industrial unions fought to pass the restrictive 1921 and 1924
Immigration Acts. Later, Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers was crucial in fighting the Bracero Program, the Mexican temporary worker program in effect from 1942 to 1964. Unions (unsuccessfully) opposed the 1965 Immigration Act that ended quotas and expanded immigration, and well into the 1980s, AFL-CIO and member unions lobbied for “employee sanctions” (against employers hiring illegal immigrants).

In recent decades, however, unions have begun to break from this restrictionism. By the late 1970s, the garment workers (ILGW and ACTWU) and service sector (SEIU) unions, and, somewhat later, the farm workers (UFW) and hotel workers (HERE), opposed restrictionist immigration laws, called for amnesty of undocumented workers, and opposed use of sanctions against employers hiring such workers (Haus 1994; Watts 2002). Leaning against the restrictionism of other unions, especially in the building-trades (IBEW, Painters, Plumbers, etc.), these more pro-immigrant forces pushed the AFL-CIO to moderate its traditional line. Thus by the mid-1980s, the AFL-CIO combined its push for employer sanctions with support for general amnesty for undocumented workers living in the U.S. for one year prior to the new law. And in the 1990s, the AFL-CIO went considerably further, arguing in 1995 that “[t]he notion that immigrants are to blame for the deteriorating living standards of America’s low wage workers must be clearly rejected.” (Briggs 2001: 166). AFL-CIO Resolutions included ever-stronger formulations in favor of immigrant groups, with the Executive Council in 1999 admitting the failure of and calling for abolition of the employer sanctions it had fought so hard to create in the 1980s.

The current AFL position is both pro-immigrant and pro-immigration. They have called for another general amnesty, expanded allowance for family-reunion immigration, expedited legal procedures, sanctions against employers abusing immigration rules to suppress worker rights, and "orderly" legal immigration with existing quotas. Executive Council statements and Federation Resolutions still call for better border enforcement against illegal immigration, opposition to Bracero-like temporary worker programs, and punishment of “employers who recruit undocumented
workers from abroad, either directly or indirectly” (AFL-CIO 2/16/00). But clearly, unions have strengthened their embrace of incumbent immigrants and softened their opposition to new immigration.

This policy shift has sparked considerable controversy about conditions under which immigration hurts unions and about why the movement has turned to embrace immigration in general. A brief review of scholarship on both issues reveals how neither can be resolved without understanding trade offs that immigration poses for unions in terms of recruiting new members versus representing existing ones.

1.1 How Immigration Affects Unions: A Trade Off in Sight but out of Focus

U.S. immigration levels have risen rapidly in the forty years since passage of the Immigration Act of 1965. Since then, the rate of foreign-born population has grown faster than at any other period in US history, from an all-time low of 4.4 percent of total population in 1965, to more than 11 percent in 2000 – a growth of 47 percent in the 1970s, 40 percent in the 1980s, and 43 percent in the 1990s (Camorata 2001: 3; CPS 2001). Equally important have been changes in the composition of the US immigration pool. The pre-1970s pool harbored immigrant workers of European descent as the largest cohort (1.8 million compared to the next largest, Mexico, at 683,000). By the 1990s, however, Mexicans and East Asians dominated the immigrant pool (27.7 and 17.9 percent, respectively). Post-1980 immigrants also tend to be less educated than those entering before 1970: to be sure, a slightly higher percentage of immigrants have a graduate or professional degree (though this has dropped from 17.7 for the pre-1970s group to 8.8 for the 1980-89 group, reflecting some skilled-labor and student immigration; on the other hand, 29.8 percent of immigrants have less than a high school education, much higher a percentage than the 8 percent for natives (CPS 2001).

What does growing and changing immigration mean for unions? Existing research does
point to, if only implicitly, a recruitment-representation trade off between organizing new outsiders and forcefully representing “insider” incumbent members. By increasing labor supply, immigration inflows should also affect the strength and density of American unions. In which direction, however, is unclear in existing studies. The pessimist position is well represented by Briggs, who argues that “...unions thrive (membership grows) when immigration is low or levels are contracting; unions falter (membership declines) during periods when immigration is high or levels are increasing” (Briggs 2001: 3). The logic is that immigration increases labor supply and creates a more economically vulnerable and docile labor pool. Both factors complicate organizing efforts and weaken the power of workers relative to employers – thereby undermining unionization drives.

The alternative view is that immigration has neutral or modest effects for union membership, paling in comparison with other influences (Bernstein 2001; Palley 2001). Such scholars suggest that the main culprit of US labor's decline since the 1950s is not immigration but weak labor laws, employer power, and the decline of easier-to-organize manufacturing sectors relative to services (Goldfield 1987; Palley 2001: 12; Western 1997). Both sides of this issue, however, have tended to support their claims about immigration with anecdote and very broad, general tendencies. To the extent that more systematic research has been done on how immigration affects union density, the evidence suggests the lack of significant effects, positive or negative (XXX).¹

Some research has focused on the micro- or meso-level conditions that affect how “organizable” immigrants are compared to their native counterparts. Funkhouser (1993) found that recent immigrants tended to be no less likely to join unions than their native counterparts, once one controlled for a range of demographic conditions and for the length of stay of foreign-born respondents. On the other hand, Funkhouser also found that the union-wage premium for foreign-born females tended to be significantly lower than for native-born females, though not significantly different between foreign- and native-born men. And at the margins of a broader study on immigrant
wages, Bratsberg et al.’s (2002) micro-data on wage levels among immigrants and native workers suggest that union membership (statistically) significantly raises wages, but that this effect is diminished among immigrants. Contradicting this are a few studies conducted by the labor movement, where in at least some sectors (e.g. hotels and restaurants) the union wage premium is highest among female, foreign-born workers (c.f. AFL-CIO 2005). There is, thus, mixed evidence on what immigration means for union membership and density.

Industrial relations experts have also debated how immigration affects unions’ bargaining strength in representing members. The pessimistic position among union supporters – again epitomized by Briggs – is that any organizing “successes” in embracing immigration weaken bargaining position for incumbent union members. Unfortunately, there has been little systematic empirical research into this issue, despite the very developed work on union wage premiums and on immigration and wage inequality (Blanchflower and Bryson 2004; Borjas 1999; Bratsberg and Ragan 2002; Catanzarite 2004; Freeman and Medoff 1984). Some evidence on immigrant wages indirectly supports the pessimistic position. The micro-level evidence that union membership might yield lower wage increases for (at least some) immigrants (Bratsberg et al. 2002; Funkhouser 1993), suggests possible lowering of the wage premium due to immigration. And findings that immigration levels tend to raise the wage premium for high-skilled workers (Borjas 1999) and to raise inequality between production and non-production manufacturing workers (Tavakoli and Grenier 2004) are consistent with such pessimism, given that union membership is concentrated in lower-skilled occupations.  

In sum, there’s plenty in existing industrial relations literature suggesting that immigration confronts unions with a recruitment-representation trade off. Debate about the virtues or vices of recent changes in AFL-CIO strategies, indeed, recognizes precisely such a trade off. Critics insist it will be a disaster for working people by hastening immigration inflows with negative effects for
unions and workers. Such critics emphasize that currying favor with immigrant groups may increase union membership, but will do little to help the low-skilled groups they might organize and will alienate native-born workers (Briggs 2001; 2003). Thus, another amnesty may help organizing, but will also spark more illegal immigration (as did the last "never-again" amnesty) with negative income, poverty and public economy effects. Supporters believe, in contrast, that the new pro-immigrant stance is crucial to union survival, a vehicle for organizing the fast-growing and union-hungry immigrant population in growth sectors of the economy. Supporters counter that restrictionism wasn't succeeding in influencing immigration policy anyway, that it complicated organizing drives, and that using the pro-immigrant lever to lift union density is the surest route to bringing workers long-term economic justice, even if that means medium-term pain for native workers.

Despite these many contributions, the basic extent of the recruitment-representation trade off posed by immigration remains vaguely understood. Most obviously, direct measures of how immigration affects union organizing and membership remain rough – based too much on anecdote or broad aggregate trends in union density. Looking at trends across occupations or sectors might help us see whether a possible recruitment-representation trade off varies substantially across segments of the labor movement. We also need to consider the implication of rising foreign-born shares of the union movement, which may affect both the nature of who the union insiders are and the political choices their unions make. Across unions, it might be that rising foreign-born shares at the occupational or sector level might correlate with rises in the share of certain unions in the total labor union membership. Whether this is so also remains uninvestigated.

The above are all ways in which foreign-born shares in employment and union membership might help reveal the extent of the recruitment side of the trade off. As for the representation costs to the insiders, we know even less, because this is harder to judge. In trying to gauge whether the benefits of union membership are undermined by immigration, we might be able to figure out
whether union wage premiums have been higher or lower, or have risen or dropped more, in high foreign-born unions and sectors and periods than in unions, sectors, periods with lower foreign-born shares.

1.2. What Explains Unions Strategies?: Behind and Beyond the AFL-CIO’s Embrace

Exogenous changes in immigration alone do not fully determine the trade offs unions face. Rather, the effects of immigration for union membership, density, and bargaining performance are likely mediated by the reception immigrants receive by unions. For example the effects of immigration certainly reflect the willingness of immigrants to break strikes, their sense of solidarity with native workers, and their docility or militancy towards employers. But these features are not just “essential” features of immigrants, their cultures, or their economic environment, but also of their legal status and treatment by unions. To the degree that unions and polities make immigrant life more precarious, exogenous increases in immigration can be expected to hurt unionism more than where unions embrace and integrate immigrants. We thus need to understand union strategies for dealing with immigration, strategies that vary over time and across unions.

Why might unions support immigration, and in particular, why might the AFL-CIO Federation have turned to a pro-immigrant stance if the payoffs were uncertain and the potential costs high? Commentary on this question identifies at least four conditions that help explain the policy reversal. First, globalization has made tighter immigration control difficult; more accessible communication and transportation combined with economic instability in the Southern Hemisphere provide new incentives to seek out the US job miracle, and thousands of miles of densely populated borders and a liberal society make for tough immigration control (Haus 1994; Watts 2002). If unions cannot stop immigration, organizing immigrants may be a better use of scarce political economic resources.
Second, tight immigration laws force immigrants into a precarious legal position and thus provide tools for employers to frustrate unionization and collective bargaining -- as when employers demand that workers show documentation just when a shop-floor begins to organize (Haus 1994; Palley 2001; Watts 2002). Third, many US unions recognized that restrictionism has impeded the organization of high-immigrant service sectors and that pro-immigrant policies facilitate organizing drives in these sectors (Briggs 2001; Haus 1998; Watts 2002). Worker Centers focused on the needs of immigrant workers may even constitute an alternative to union representation – a warning that for immigrants, unions are not the only game in town (Fine 2006). Finally, unions are aware that their past restrictionism on immigration complicated relations with the broader American progressive movement, so that union leaders may recently have been, as Briggs unflatteringly puts it, "seeking to become a part of the Rainbow Coalition" (Briggs 2001).

Although such explanations certainly capture important dimensions of the story, we are aware of no systematic research into how basic trends in the foreign-born share of workers in total employment and in the union movement might explain not only the recent embrace by the AFL-CIO but also continued divisions among US unions over issues of immigration. If there really is a recruitment-representation trade off, might variations in union strategies towards immigrants reflect the depth of this trade off for the particular union and time of decision? For instance, might variations in how foreign-born shares of the workforce affect membership and bargaining strength help explain the past and current strategies of unions towards immigration? And in light of such developments, are there still important divisions within the labor movement on how to deal with immigration and immigrants?

In light of the two debates about unions and immigration – namely, how immigration affects union recruitment and representation capabilities and their strategies toward subsequent immigration – the questions for us are simple: how serious are the trade offs immigration poses for unions? And how might variation in the depth of such trade offs across unions and time tell us about the strategies
of various unions, including the contemporary split within the AFL-CIO fold?

2. How Much of a Trade Off is there in Membership and Wage Premiums?

2.1. National Trends

To answer these two questions, we begin with the trade off of immigration’s promise for recruitment of outsiders and its bargaining pitfalls for insiders. We focus first on national trends and then on sector and occupational developments. Most obviously, demographic and union membership trends at the level of the labor movement as a whole make it abundantly clear how important foreign-born workers are to the real and potential union membership base. In addition to the steep rise in the percentage of the foreign born population in the total population – from 4.7 percent in 1970 to 11.1 percent in 2000 – is the sharp rise in the foreign-born (both citizen and non-citizen) percentage of the labor force (total employed and unemployed in the US working-age population). Figure One summarizes that rise in recent years, from 9.4 percent in 1990 to 14.4 percent in 2003, a 53 percent increase. The story is similar if one looks at other measures of immigrant groups, such as the Hispanic share of the labor force and union populations. Meanwhile, the Hispanic proportion of union membership has nearly doubled in the last twenty-five years, from 6.9 percent in 1985 to 11.4 percent in 2001 (US Census, own calculations). Such trends make it abundantly clear that the foreign-born generally were, and are likely to continue to be, a growing part of the US labor pool and potential union membership base. Potentially more important to the labor movement, Figure One also summarizes the increase in the foreign-born share of total union membership – rising from 8.1 in 1994 to 11.4 percent in 2003 – a 41 percent increase. This suggests that foreign-born workers and immigrants are a growing share of actual as well as potential union membership –
changing the identity of the rank-and-file, and perhaps attitudes about immigration (more on this below).

**[Figure One about here]**

On the other hand, the union density for foreign-born workers has consistently lagged behind that of natives, and it has actually declined more rapidly than for the native population. Figure Two captures this tendency. It shows that between 1990 and 2004, union density among foreign-born workers dropped by 36 percent, from 13.7 percent in 1990 to 8.8 percent in 2004, compared to a 14 percent decrease for native workers (from 15 percent in 1990 to 13 percent in 2004). Such a trend suggests that recent immigrants may be proportionately more difficult to organize than their native counterparts, and/or that the labor movement has not done enough or the right things to organize such workers. And if so, this begins to capture the downside of the immigration trade off, since union density is one important determinant of union bargaining strength. A more direct measure of such strength is the union wage premium. As immigration has sky-rocketed, such premiums have first risen – from roughly 14 percent in the early 1970s to more than 20 percent in 1984 – and since then dropping considerably to 16.5 percent in 2002 (though up from a thirty-year low of some 13 percent in 2000 (Blanchflower and Bryson 2003).

**[Figure Two about here]**

2.2. *Across Occupations and Sectors*

Trends across various industry segments or occupations provide more direct evidence that the US labor movement’s recruitment trajectories might indeed be tied to organizing immigrants but also that membership representation might be hindered by immigration. Detailed evidence on
Comparison of union wage premiums across occupational or industry categories is rougher (44 categories at the two-digit level) in two period, 1983-88 and 1996-2001 (Blanchflower and Bryson 2003). For employment, union membership and wage premiums, it is clear that the aggregate trends in both figures above mask significant variation across occupations. In 1994, for instance, the coefficient of variation for percentage of foreign-born workers per occupation was greater than unity (1.02), and has actually become even more dispersed since then (1.14 in 2000).

The data also reveal whether the foreign-born shares of workers in a particular occupation correlate over time with levels and changes in total employment, union density, proportion of union membership, and union wage premiums. Table One does this by focusing on simple cross-sectional regressions of levels and changes in employment, union density, share of total union membership, and union wage premium. Each of these parameters is regressed on foreign-born workers as a proportion of occupation-segment employment, along with two substantive controls: unemployment rate per occupation-segment and education level per occupation segment (proportion of those with an Associate’s or higher Degree). We consider two sets of estimations. The first focuses on how foreign-born shares in an occupation segment (averaged between 1994 and 2000) affects that segment’s total employment, union density, share of total union membership in 2000, or union wage premium (average 1996-2001). The second focuses on how changes in foreign-born shares (2000-1994) affect changes in employment, union density, share of union membership (2000-1994) and the wage premium (the period-average for 1996-2001 minus the period-average for 1983-88). Because the relevant data in comparable form is only available from 1994, cross-sections of changes are preferable to a panel analysis. Shown, in any event, are the standardized beta coefficients for
foreign-born shares of occupational employment, with significance levels calculated on the basis of robust standard errors (to address unit-level correlation and heteroskedasticity).\textsuperscript{7}

[Table One about here]

Although such evidence remains suggestive, the broad story is clear. On the one hand, there does indeed appear to be a significant negative relationship between the foreign-born share of workers in a given occupation and union density in that occupation – consistent with what Figure Two above suggests. But foreign-born share is an insignificant predictor for total employment, share of union movement, and wage premiums. On the other hand, understanding how recent immigrants affect the future organizing and bargaining prospects and the stances of the labor movement, the more relevant measures may well be \textit{changes} in employment, union density, proportion of union movement, and wage premiums. And focusing on such changes reveals more clearly than do absolute measures the trade offs that unions may face.

The correlation between changes in foreign-born share of occupation and changes in total employment, union density, and share of total national union membership are all \textit{positive}, significantly so (above 99 percent confidence) with respect to total employment and share of total membership. The strongest of these relationships is with change in total employment. There, for instance, occupation segments at the 50\textsuperscript{th} percentile of the nearly 500 occupations in the foreign-born proportion of employment (11 percent) tended to experience a growth in total occupational employment between 1994 and 2000 of roughly 1 percent. In contrast, occupations at the 75\textsuperscript{th} percentile of foreign-born share of employment (19.4 percent) tend to experience growth of nearly 20 percent. This is an indication that, whatever was happening at the level of union organizing, the pool of workers relevant to the future of the labor movement rested disproportionately with those occupations with the highest proportions of recent immigrants. Such a result is, of course, consistent
with the aggregate trends in rising foreign-born workers as a share of the labor force.

More surprising are the results for changes in union organization. Increases in foreign-born shares correlate positively with that occupation’s share of the overall labor movement. This provides some indication that the recent past and future of the labor movement was helped rather than hindered by organizing recent immigrants. The positive effect that an occupation’s share of foreign-born workers appears to have on the change in the share of total union membership is consistent with the aggregate increase of the foreign-born share of total union membership in Figure One above. In any event, the positive coefficients for changes in foreign-born shares in affecting union density belie the aggregate tendency of foreign-born union density to lag increasingly behind native density, as shown in Figure Two. Occupations with lower than median foreign-born workers lost nearly 20 percent of density, while those with higher-than-median foreign-born workers lost only 5 percent. These apparently contradictory results are reconciled, of course, by the fact that some of the 500 occupations analyzed are much larger in total employment than others. But differences across occupation mean that immigrant-heavy occupations might be more “organizable” than many think.

Figure Three provides a visual snapshot of how foreign-born shares map onto changes in an occupation’s union members as a share of total union membership. The Figure shows a slightly positive relationship, consistent with the more fine-grained analysis in Table One, and it also shows which (broad) occupational categories are outliers in the relationship. For instance, one can see that occupations that are mainly or disproportionately public employees tend to have a higher growth in proportion of union membership than one would expect from their proportions of foreign-born workers. And in fact, the positive relationships between foreign-born proportion and change in union membership or proportion of union movement, shown in Table One, are stronger in terms of coefficients and significance if one focuses only on “private-sector” occupations (excluding, for instance, protective services, armed forces, and public administration).
Table One also provides some indication of how organizing opportunities of rising foreign-born shares of employment might be traded off against the affect on the union wage premium associated with such shares. The sign of the coefficient for changes in foreign-born share is negative but insignificant, suggesting a mixed picture. There is no evidence that more immigration significantly reduces the union wage premium in a given occupational segment. But higher foreign-born proportions are more likely to negatively affect the wage premiums than to improve it. Thus, the trade off, if it exists, is not significant for the general labor movement.

These national and occupational trends give us more clarity on the depth of the trade offs that immigration poses for unions. Our central finding is that the trade off is visible, but also less sharp than many fear. On one hand, there is clear evidence that union membership is becoming more dependent on organizing immigrants – that the labor force and labor movement are both becoming increasingly foreign-born and that the sectors with the highest and fastest growing foreign-born shares are also those becoming bigger parts of the labor movement and the labor force. On the other hand, some evidence indicates this may come at a price for incumbent members. Levels of union density associated with the turn to more foreign-born workers does seem to suggest that density levels will fall faster with immigration – something visible in both the national and occupational-level data. And there’s also some evidence that union wage premiums are more likely to be negatively than positively related to rising foreign-born shares. Nonetheless, the occupational data also suggests that the down-side of this trade off might be modest, in that changes in foreign-born shares are not significantly related to changes in either density or wage premiums. This is potentially good news for unions in their struggles to grow in their nation of rising immigrants.
3. How the Trade Off Affects Union Strategies: From AFL-CIO to the CTW Split

The above trends help us understand how immigration affects unions, but they also shed light on what might underlie union strategies towards immigrants. Most broadly, the AFL-CIO U-turn on immigration in 1999 likely reflects the rise in immigration as a share of the labor force; but it also seems that there is continued divergence in the importance of immigrants to the recruitment and representation fortunes of various unions. This is not only visible in the national trends, but also in occupational-level developments, where we saw that those occupation-segments with the fastest growing foreign-born share also tended to have the fastest-growing share of total union membership. These trends support an important explanation for the Federation’s embrace of immigration: that the movement was becoming increasingly dependent on immigrants in total, absolute membership, and that the rising share of such immigrants in the rank-and-file and for future “organizing or dying,” required doing whatever was possible to convince immigrants that unions are on their side.

To make this story believable, however, requires focusing not only on the national or occupational-level trends, but instead on differences across unions themselves. Individual unions, of course, usually have memberships drawn from a range of separate occupations and industries. And understanding even the most basic demography of unions is often difficult, because unions do not usually publicize or in most cases keep accurate records of the immigration status of members – often as an explicit strategy not to scare off potential immigrant members. But one can judge particular unions by the changing demographics in the core occupations or industries they represent.

The occupation-level data introduced above capture the foreign-born proportions of the core occupations of those unions who most supported reversing the AFL-CIO’s restrictive stance on immigration. The sample average foreign-born share of workers is about 13 percent in 2000, roughly the level of “freight handlers” occupations in Figure Three above. The main point is that the core sectors relevant to several of the most pro-immigration unions have significantly higher
proportions: 24 percent for cleaning and building services (SEIU, HERE), 16 percent for health services (SEIU), 23 percent for construction labor (LIUNA). Such information clarifies why these unions, in particular, might be interested in the AFL-CIO taking a more positive line towards immigrants: to appeal to the needs and preferences of their own rank-and-file and to leverage continued organizing in their disproportionately foreign-born core target sectors and occupations. In contrast, the unions opposed to a loosening of immigration, including the industrial unions (e.g. UAW, Steelworkers) and the more skilled building trades unions, had significantly lower or only slightly higher-than-average foreign-born shares. For instance, auto production had a foreign-born share of 6 percent in 2000, and the construction trades a 16.5 percent share (CPS 2000).

On the other hand, these data cannot tell the whole story of why unions might be more or less supportive of loose immigration laws or immigrant organizing. A number of building trades unions, such as Boilermakers and IBEW, were organizing not only construction trades (where foreign-born shares are at 16.5 percent, close to the 13.5 percent sample average in 2000), but also construction laborers (with the 23 percent foreign-born share). Yet unlike LIUNA, they were hostile to changes in the AFL-CIO restrictionism on immigration. The difference was partly one of skill-levels of the core constituencies – where some of these unions (e.g. IBEW) focused on higher-skilled craft than LIUNA – and partly a question of strategy of LIUNA to organize immigrants directly. The proportion of recent immigrants in LIUNA also was likely higher than that of the other building trades unions – such that the occupational- or industry-level figures mask variation across the unions ostensibly servicing the “construction” workers. But this has to remain guesswork, based on the higher Hispanic membership in LIUNA than in other building trades, as none of these unions has released comparable estimates of the regional breakdown of their membership.

The occupation-based figures also do not capture how some low-immigrant unions might have an interest in looser immigration laws. Most obviously, public sector unions, such as AFSCME and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), have low levels of immigrants yet supported a
change in the AFL-CIO position. This is visible in Figure Three above, where merely 5 percent of public administrators and 6.5 percent non-university teachers are foreign-born (compared, again, to the 13.5 percent sample average). AFSCME and AFT have supported looser immigration laws for more than a decade, in part because immigrant groups were important and growing shares of their constituencies – not as union members but as “purchasers” of their services (public services, education). Indeed, the California branch of the AFT was the single largest opponent of that state’s anti-immigrant Proposition 187. The foreign-born proportions may be an important predictor of support for looser immigration, but they are likely neither necessary nor sufficient to such support.

To judge the intra-movement influence of these unions, Figure Four compares the share of the total AFL-CIO membership among the ten largest member unions in 1985 and 2002. This data suggests that pro-immigrant unions were becoming a larger share of total AFL-CIO membership. The most vocal of the large supporters of a change in AFL immigration policy, the UFCW and, especially, the SEIU, saw significant increases in their share of dues-paying members of the Federation – SEIU becoming by 2002 the largest member of the AFL-CIO. And among the top ten unions, the UAW and Steelworkers, neither expressing much interest in embracing immigrant workers, experienced significant declines in their share of Federation membership. Finally, Figure Four also shows the significant and modestly increasing shares for two public-sector unions – the AFSCME and American Federation of Teachers. Near the middle of Figure Four, two unions do buck this trend. LIUNA, an explicitly pro-immigrant union, became smaller as a share of the Federation total, and IAM, one of the industrial unions not very active in supporting a policy shift, actually grew in its share of the Federation total. Aside from these exceptions, the pattern holds.

[Figure Four about here]
In light of all these developments, the 1999 change in the AFL-CIO stance makes more sense, whatever the more complicated machinations of intra-union politics and strategies towards other open-border groups may suggest. By the late 1990s, the Federation leadership judged embracing immigrants and looser immigration policies as in the best interests of union organizing, even if they recognized the potential costs for the incumbent members and a gamble from the perspective of the broader working population. And the most important developments signaling that embracing immigrants and looser immigration laws might be good for organizing are simple trends in the share of recent immigrants in employment and union membership.

3.1 Continued Division?: Immigration and the Change-to-Win Coalition (CTW)

The cross-sector and cross-union comparisons all help make sense of the changes in the broad AFL-CIO position in the late 1990’s – towards a broad recognition by the Federation leadership of the importance of foreign-born workers to the future of the movement, or at least capitulation to such a view held by the movement’s fastest-growing and largest unions. Within five years of this decision, however, a number of these same unions broke away from the AFL-CIO. The reasons for the break-away are obviously complicated – a mix of personality conflicts among leaders of the member unions, deep disagreements about Federation power over member unions, and a divide over the priority given to organizing as opposed to legislative or other priorities. However, in light of the above discussion of variation across unions in their focus on foreign-born workers, it is revealing that the break-away faction was led by the unions most at-odds with the pre-1999 AFL-CIO position on immigration.
A range of developments in the foreign-born shares across unions provides fuel for the conjecture that tensions over immigration played at least some role in the split. We concentrate on foreign-born shares for the lead sectors relevant to the CTW unions, and compare these with the average share for all employment. Figure Five compares such shares, focusing on how foreign-born shares compared in 1994, 2000, and 2005 (the full span of comparable CPS data), compared to the average shares in the same years for total employment (calculated from the full CPS employment sample). Even though some AFL-CIO unions organize in these “CTW” categories as well, the comparison gives a general impression of the different foreign-born shares of the target occupations and sectors of the CTW versus the AFL-CIO.  

[Figure Five about here]

The Figure shows that all these unions’ core industries or occupations have consistently been more dependent on foreign-born workers than average sectors – taking the foreign-share for the sample average as an indicator. In 2005, in fact, the core occupations and industries of CTW unions had an average share of 27 percent, 65 percent more than the average for all employees (16 percent). And as the Figure also makes clear, the share of foreign-born workers has grown between 1994 and 2005, an average growth of 42 percent (compared to 38 percent growth for the employment average). Significantly, the disparity in the foreign-born shares of the CTW’s core occupations compared to the shares in the average sector has actually grown since 2005. Altogether, then, the Figures suggest not only that the CTW break-away unions have significantly higher foreign-born shares than the rest of the labor movement, but also have become more different with time.

Along with these recruitment differences, we also found representation differences. To roughly capture how bargaining strength of the CTW unions compares to the rest of the labor movement, we compare union wage premiums of the same “core” occupations and industries with
those for the movement as a whole. Figure Six summarizes such wage premiums in two periods, 1983-88 and 1996-2001. As is clear from the bar graph, the wage premiums of the core sectors of the CTW unions tend to be higher in both periods than for the sample as a whole. This suggests that these more immigrant-heavy break-away unions have actually tended to award union membership more than do most non-CTW unions. On the other hand, the changes in the union premiums between the two periods suggest that CTW unions have experienced slightly bigger declines in their union wage premiums (16%) than has the union movement generally (14%). It could be, thus, that the CTW orientation might come with some cost to representation of incumbent workers – that they are, indeed, experiencing some trade off in their strategies.

[Figure Six about here]

The messiness of the break away also harbors plenty to support the conjecture that divisions on immigration partly underlie (or at least manifest) the current rift in the union movement between CTW and the AFL-CIO. For instance, just before the official split, UNITE-HERE president John Wilhelm resigned from the AFL-CIO Immigration Subcommittee, citing differences on the McCain-Kennedy bill on immigration, which he supports and the AFL-CIO opposes. UNITE-HERE’s resolution on immigration reform calls for “allowing undocumented workers and their families the opportunity to earn legal status through a new legalization program; full workplace rights for immigrants, including the right to organize, job portability, and protections for whistleblowers; replacement of employer sanctions with a system that targets and criminalizes business behavior that exploits workers; and a mechanism developed by labor and business to meet legitimate needs for new workers without compromising the rights and opportunities of workers already in the United States” (Daily Labor Report 7/29/05). The official AFL-CIO position largely mirrors this position but departs significantly on the last point – the guestworker program – which we discuss below.

The priority on organizing that divides the CTW and AFL-CIO tends to manifest itself not
only in simple budgetary terms – the 50-75 percent of union budgets devoted to organizing campaigns demanded by SEIU and HERE versus the 30-35 percent promised by AFL-CIO president John Sweeney – nor even the dispute over the Federation’s power over member unions (c.f. Fine 2005). Also at work are different priorities in targeting immigrant groups for organizing, even if this might create problems for incumbent workers in the form of lower union wage premiums. “Organize or die” unions are committed to organize everyone “now now now,” while other unions try to balance organizing new members with spending resources on legislative action to help workers generally and increase organizing prospects (improve labor standards protections, pass anti-replacement worker laws).

This “organizing imperative” of the CTW unions does not stop at national borders. SEIU President Andy Stern – who often calls the U.S. labor movement “male, pale and stale” – argues that “For workers to thrive, big labor has to act as big business does: Go global, recruit without borders, unionize workers across entire economic sectors” (Duke 2006). Stern often highlights SEIU’s success in recruiting Hispanic workers and has supported a guest worker program that would bring more Hispanic immigrants. As noted, the AFL-CIO opposes a new temporary worker program (Hiatt and Avendaño 2006). Proposals to bring in 300,000 to 400,000 temporary workers annually have backing from a broad range of business, civil rights, religious, and labor groups, including UNITE-HERE, SEIU, and LIUNA. AFL-CIO associate general counsel Ana Avendaño argued against the proposals, saying, “All guestworker programs have been a failure, not just in the United States, but around the world....We're not a nation of guests. We're a nation of citizens” (AFL-CIO 2006a). SIEU Executive Vice President Eliseo Medina argued, however, that the new proposal could be “part of the solution” in US immigration policy. “We need future workers to get to this country,” said Medina, who adds that they should then given the right to organize (Daily Labor Report 1/13/06). While both LIUNA and HERE have supported the Kennedy-McCain legislation, LIUNA has been
cautious about temporary worker programs that create “a second class of residents,” one of the pitfalls the AFL-CIO has stressed (http://www.cirnow.org/file/169.doc; Hiatt and Avendaño 2006).

What drives the differences in strategy toward these bills? Wilhelm and others argue that the labor movement cannot “continue to ignore reality” and must instead prepare a legal way for immigrants to work in the U.S. Much of their argument hangs on the benefits of taking immigrant labor “out of the shadows” by making it legal and therefore assertive in defense of its own rights (www.immigrationforum.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=721). Critics, including prominent AFL-CIO officials like Sweeney and Linda Chavez-Thompson, often argue that legal immigration is a magnet for subsequent illegal immigration, so that amnesty programs – whatever their benefit in emboldening immigrant workers in their dealings with employers – cannot stop the cycle of illegal entry that ultimately pulls down wages for all workers. Moreover, critics see the labor safeguards of all four bills as likely unenforceable, and they are especially skeptical of guest-worker programs that link immigrant workers to individual employers (AFL-CIO 2006b). Thus, without categorically rejecting new guest-worker programs, the AFL-CIO has signaled intense skepticism. Other critics of guest-worker programs from the left argue that labor groups that support such programs run the risk of seeing their safeguards stripped out by business interests who are the main backers of the program once the guest-worker program is in place (Bacon 2005).

A final kind of suggestive data on the tensions among unions over immigration comes via emerging research on worker centers. Worker centers are “community-based and community-led organizations that engage in a combination of service, advocacy, and organizing to provide support to low-wage workers” (Fine 2006: 3). Most worker centers serve immigrant populations and pressure employers to pay back wages or improve unsafe working conditions, help immigrants learn English, and advocate the enforcement of municipal and state rules to improve conditions for immigrants. Worker centers have complex relationships with trade unions, sometimes serving as a
matchmaker between disgruntled workers and potential unions, but also, though rarely, organizing their own independent unions.

Out of such complexity, however, it is still clear that the CTW unions are more engaged with works councils than are AFL-CIO unions. The unions that would become CTW unions have a longer history of engagement with worker centers, including the UFCW, LIUNA, SEIU, and HERE, than those unions that have stayed with the AFL-CIO. Such engagement, however, varies substantially. There are cases in which unions saw worker centers as junior partners (for example, HERE encouraged a worker center in San Francisco to focus on hard-to-organize restaurants while it focused on hotels) or as alternatives to abandoning an effort to win a contract (for example, LIUNA organized a new worker center as a fallback position for North Carolina poultry workers after management refused to honor court orders to bargain). And among the more even partnerships, there have been some significant successes, as when the UFCW bargained on behalf of over 1,000 Nebraska meat cutters originally organized by a worker center. In any event, the union-worker center relationship is delicate, and its future uncertain: some relationships are promising and getting more solid, such where LIUNA and HERE have worked with worker centers; but others have led to serious tension, such as the UFCW case, where union efforts to negotiate a contract based on workers initially organized by a worker center left many workers dissatisfied with the union’s “formulaic” and “top-down” approach (Fine 2006: 263).

Of course, alongside the differences highlighted above, CTW unions must confront many of the same disincentives to organize high-immigrant sectors as any other union, including slack labor markets for low-skilled workers, small firms, and short-term employment relationships. CTW unions often set strict limits on which workers they will try to organize – such as HERE’s decision to focus on hotels over restaurants or UNITE’s focus on sector giant Cintas and relative neglect of other garment workers. As a result, worker centers often respond to short-term provocations against workers that may not fit the strategic plans of existing unions. As Fine argues, even if unions stick to
their organizing plans with iron discipline, they need organizational capacity to respond to spontaneous outbreaks of worker disaffection with employers (2006: 254-55). Thus, experience with worker centers confirms that if some CTW unions may face labor market conditions that soften the recruitment-representation trade off, other features of that trade off are hard to escape.

4. Conclusion

How does immigration affect American unions, and how are these unions dealing with immigration during a time when membership levels are stagnant or declining? This paper has provided some answers to these questions by analyzing the depth and implications of a recruitment-representation trade off – where immigration constitutes a rising share of existing and future union membership, but where it might undermine bargaining strength and representation of incumbent members. Although based on imperfect, often indirect measures of both the trade off and its implications for strategy, two broad conclusions stand out.

In the first place, the paper reported several trends in employment, union membership, and wage premiums, suggesting that the trade off is real, though less severe than some industrial relations experts fear. Rises in recent immigration tend to correlate with rising foreign-born employment and increases in the foreign-born share of union membership, while such immigration appears not to significantly reduce union density or occupational-level wage premiums.

The research also suggested that changes in and differences among American unions have significant roots in variations in the recruitment-representation trade off. In particular, we focused on two developments in strategy. First, there is some evidence that the general shift towards more pro-immigration stances in the labor movement reflects increases in the membership benefits of such immigration: there is a general trend of rising foreign-born shares of employment and union membership, and significant positive correlation between rising foreign-born shares of employment
and rising shares of total union membership; also, the particular unions targeting immigrant-rich sectors and occupations tend to have grown the most, especially in terms of the share of total union membership. Second, our research identifies significant differences across unions in foreign-born shares and in union wage premiums that suggest continued division within the US labor movement on issues of immigration, and more interestingly suggest that the recent break-off of the Change-to-Win coalition from the AFL-CIO may reflect and in any event manifests such division.

These findings provide no definitive answers about how immigration affects unions and about where union strategies come from. Better, perhaps different answers, could emerge from more research into patterns of immigration across occupations and sectors over longer periods of time, and with more measures of union representation and bargaining strength. Better answers into the subjective side of the story might also emerge from new, more detailed data on opinions of native and immigrant workers on these features of union activity. In the meantime, however, the research reported in this paper highlights how important immigration is to the future of labor unions and how significant division among unions on issues of immigration can be to that future.
Notes

1. Analysis of time series of US unionization rates and pooled time-series cross-section of such rates across US states, revealed immigration to be an insignificant predictor of union density once controlling for basic macroeconomic conditions (XXX).

2. Borjas (1999) estimates an "immigration surplus" for US aggregate income of roughly 0.1% of GDP, but also redistribution of income from labor to capital, where native-born workers lose 1.9% of GDP in lower wages while capital owners gain 2 percent of GDP in capital gains. For a contrasting view finding net positive benefits to average native workers, see Peri and Ottavio 2006.

3. See the debate sponsored by the Center for Immigration Studies (2003), and for more tendentious examples, compare David Bacon's (1998, 2001) support with Roy Beck's (2001) opposition.

4. Trends predict that the proportion of Hispanics will grow from the roughly 13 percent in 2005 to more than 14 percent in 2010 and almost 16 percent in 2015 (US Census, own calculations).

5. The CPS data on country of birth and union membership is more broken-down by occupations (500 categories) than by industrial-sector (118 categories).

6. The period 1994 to 2000 is most relevant to the immigration controversies in the late 1990’s, beginning as early as the disaggregated data allow (1994); and it allows a common categorization of occupations to study change over time – difficult after 2001 when the categorization was altered. For data on wage premiums, we use the closest comparable time period in the available data on such premiums – comparison of the 1983-88 and 1996-2001 snapshots from the Blanchflower and Bryson (2003) data.

7. Not shown for reasons of space are coefficients and standard errors for the controls (unemployment rate and education level. Tables with full results and estimations without controls are available from author's website (www.XXX)).

8. Immigrant groups rely much more than natives on most public assistance, partly because they are more likely to be in poverty (almost 17 compared to 11 percent for natives in 2001) (CPS 2002). They are more than twice as likely to draw on Earned-Income-Tax-Credit relief (26 compared to 13 percent in 2001); and to have no health insurance and thus rely on public health assistance (33 compared to 14 percent). And because immigrants are generally younger, with higher birth rates, than natives, they rely more on public education. The National Research Council study (1997) found immigrants to be a net drain on the public economy to the tune of $3,000 per immigrant lifetime.

9. CTW leaders proposed that 75% of union budgets be spent on organizing vs. the less than 30% the AFL-CIO was willing to obligate. CTW also has a much smaller leadership (Maher 2005).

10. The seven unions in the new CTW are the Service Employees International Union (SEIU); Union of Needle and Industrial Textile Employees-Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (UNITE-HERE); United Brotherhood of Carpenters (UBC); Laborers' International Union of North America (LIUNA); Teamsters; United Farm Workers (UFW);and United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW). LIUNA joined CTW without leaving the AFL-CIO.

11. It would be inaccurate to compare the CTW’s “core” occupations with the average of the remaining occupations or industry categories, because some of CTW’s core occupations are also organized by a number of AFL-CIO unions. For instance, the occupational category “Construction Labor” in the Figure captures workers organized by AFL-CIO Building Trades in addition to LIUNA and UBC. Although IBEW focuses more on more skilled “Construction trades,” they do organize workers in the “Construction labor” category.

12. There are four bills currently pending in the U.S. Congress. The "Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act," (S. 1033), introduced by Senators John McCain and Edward Kennedy, the “Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005,” (S. 1438), introduced by Senators John Cornyn and Jon Kyl, the “Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,” (H.R. 4437) introduced by Congressman James Sensenbrenner, and a four-part legislative package by Senator Chuck Hagel (S. 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919.)

References


Funkhouser, E. (1993). ‘Do immigrants have lower unionization propensities than natives?’ 


XXX.


Table One:
Proportion of foreign-born and (changes in) total employment and union membership, density and proportions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficient for Foreign-born share</th>
<th>Significance level for Foreign-born share</th>
<th>t-statistic for Foreign-born share</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Levels:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total occupation employment</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>495</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union density</td>
<td>-.137**</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-2.32</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of union members</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>-1.50</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union wage premium</td>
<td>-.086</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Changes:                                |                                               |                                        |                                   |              |
| Δ Total occupation employment           | +.372***                                      | 0                                      | 4.44                              | 487          |
| Δ Union density                         | +.096                                          | 0.131                                  | 1.52                              | 427          |
| Δ Proportion of union members           | +.072***                                      | 0.001                                  | 3.22                              | 487          |
| Δ Union wage premium                    | +.082                                          | 0.477                                  | -0.72                             | 44           |

Standardized OLS coefficients with robust standard errors. All regressions include controls for levels of or changes in unemployment rate and proportion of workers in occupation with associates degree or higher (1994 or change in rate between 1994 and 2000). Results are not shown (Tables with full results available at www.XXX).

Independent variable for all regressions:
- **Levels**: Foreign-born as proportion of occupational employment, 1994-2000 average.
- **Changes**: Δ Foreign-born as proportion of occupational employment (2000-1994)

Dependent variables:
- **Levels** for all variables except Union wage premium: year 2000 (for Union wage premium, average for 1996-2001).
- **Changes** for all variables except Union wage premium: difference between 2000 and 1994 (for Union wage premium, difference between period of 1996-2001 and period 1983-88).


* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% or lower
Figure One:
Foreign-born Workers as Percentage of Total Labor Force and Union Membership

Source: Current Population Survey, various years (own calculations).
Figure Two:
Union Density of Native and Foreign-born Wage and Salary Workers, Aged 16-65
Figure Three:
Foreign-born and Change in Union Proportion, by 1-digit Occupation, 1994-2000

% Change in proportion of total union membership, 1994-2000

Foreign-born proportion of total sector employment, average 1994-2000
Figure Four:
Share of Total AFL-CIO membership among Ten Largest Member Unions, 1985 and 2002

* “1985” for the Teamsters are for 1988, the year they rejoined the AFL-CIO
Figure Five:
Foreign-born shares of “Change-to-Win” Coalition Compared with total Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clean Jedp Service (SEIU/HBFE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction (LIUNA/Carpenters)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farm workers (United Farm Workers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health service (SEIU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motor veh. Operators (Teamsters)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apparel/Textiles (UNITE)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Food manuf. (UFCW)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food service (UFCW)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rise in Foreign-born (%): +38% +42%
Figure Six:

Drop in premium (%):
-14.4%  -16.2%

% Union Wage premium in Occupation (and main CTW Union)