

Lootable Resources and Third-Party Intervention into Civil Wars¹

Michael G. Findley and Ashley Anne Mitchell
Department of Political Science
Brigham Young University

June 23, 2011

Word Count: 8,454

* We thank Daniel Nielson, Joel Selway, and Tze Kwang Teo for helpful comments and direction and Adam Harris, Megan Spencer, and Danny Walker for research assistance. We also acknowledge support from the United States Institute of Peace and the National Science Foundation (Grant # 0904883). Corresponding Author: Michael Findley, 744 SWKT, BYU, Provo, UT, 84602, 801.422.5317, mikefindley@byu.edu

Abstract

Third parties intervene into ongoing civil wars frequently and at times with nefarious intentions. In this paper, we consider the possibility that lootable natural resources motivate third parties to intervene into wars to access natural resources, which offer a host of benefits to the intervener. When rebels have access to lootable resources, we posit that third parties will be more likely to intervene on the side of the rebels and simultaneously less likely to intervene on behalf of the government. Split population (mixture-cure) survival models, in conjunction with close attention to the dynamics of a number of individual cases, offer support for the theoretical argument, which is substantiated using different measures of lootable resources. This paper advances our understanding of the motivations for intervention into civil war by highlighting the oft-forgotten role of economic factors in motivating intervention. It further adds insights into the role of natural resources in civil wars by shifting emphasis away from domestic combatants towards the motives of outside states.

Introduction

Wamba Dia Wamba, former leader of a rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.), admitted that both Uganda and Rwanda purposefully and extensively looted Congo's precious stones, gold, and timber (Willum 2001; Ross 2004b). Although both Uganda and Rwanda have officially denied a link between resources and their decisions to intervene, estimates indicate that the two states obtained economic profits from the resources totaling hundreds of millions of dollars (Nest, et al 2006: 52-53, 69), thus raising credible suspicions that resources were at the heart of the intervention decisions. Allegations of resource-motivated, third-party intervention such as these have permeated newspaper columns over the past fifteen years, yet strikingly little scholarly research considers this relationship. This raises the question of whether, more generally, natural resources in a country engulfed in civil war motivate third parties to intervene.

Research on intervention into civil wars spans a variety of third-party motivations, ranging from humanitarian to geopolitical factors (Licklider 1995; Carment and Rowlands 1998 Regan 2000; Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007). With few exceptions (e.g., Fordham 2008), extant research ignores the role of economic factors, especially natural resources. In this paper, we consider the role of "lootable resources", which are generally considered high-value resources in a market with low barriers to entry (Le Billon 2001; Snyder 2003; Ross 2004; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). Examples of lootable resources prominently include "alluvial" diamonds-- located close to the surface in alluvial river plains--drugs, some precious timbers, as well as other precious stones, including gems, rubies, and sapphires.

Anecdotal evidence from countries as diverse as Afghanistan and Angola indicates that lootable resources may provide a key motivation for states deciding whether to intervene. And much

is at stake when third parties intervene into civil wars. (War endings appear to take much longer, especially if ending in negotiated agreement (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). When third parties intervene on opposite sides of the conflict, furthermore, they tend to exacerbate the problems, causing the wars to last longer (Regan 2002). And when wars end in military victories, they may occur much earlier than settlements (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008).

We contend that lootable resources, because of their value and relative ease of access, provide several incentives for third parties to intervene into a civil war. A third party may desire access to raw lootable resources because it desires to enter or protect the market from which it profits, irrespective of war dynamics or outcome. The revenue obtained for the resources could also be used to fuel the war towards the intervener's desired outcome. Lastly, intervention generally should be more likely to occur if natural resources are available in the civil war zone because the third party has a better chance of obtaining access to the resources.

Access to the resources may indicate, furthermore, that the party controlling the resources could have a relative advantage, making an intervener more likely to intervene to support the winning side. Thus, potential interveners may carefully consider on which side of the war to intervene based on a number of factors including resources. Control of the resources might determine what proportion of the resources an intervener can expect to access and, related, how likely the intervener and the side it supports are to win the war. As lootable resources provide a source of additive support for opposition groups (Ross 2004b), potential interveners should be more likely to support opposition groups if such groups have access to lootable resources.

To test the argument, we estimate a split-population (or mixture-cure) survival analysis of intervention into post-WWII civil wars based on Regan (2002). We begin by estimating whether resources motivate third parties to intervene at all. A competing risks framework then allows us to

distinguish between intervention on the side of the government from intervention in support of the opposition. The results offer support for the argument about intervention generally as well as about the side of intervention and indicate that lootable resources indeed motivate third-party intervention. We pay close attention to the dynamics of a number of cases, which provide further insights into the mechanisms explaining intervention.

The paper proceeds by situating the research within the context of existing literature on third-party intervention with an emphasis on the motivations for intervention, and then elucidates the theoretical mechanisms underlying the lootable resource-intervention relationship. After providing an explanation of the research design, the paper considers the statistical results and case illustrations, which offer support for the theoretical argument. Finally, it concludes with a summary of the findings and a discussion of policy implications of the research.

Intervention and the Role of Natural Resources

The third-party intervention literature has boomed in recent years (e.g., Carment, James, and Rowlands 1997; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2000; Regan 2002). Attention to lootable resources and civil war has also been prominent. Possible linkages between the two have not been systematically explored thus far, however. And yet there are compelling reasons to suspect that lootable resources frequently motivate intervention.

The Decision to Intervene into Ongoing Civil Wars

Conventional wisdom suggests that third parties intervene into ongoing civil wars for humanitarian reasons and to resolve the underlying dispute driving the war (Licklider 1995; Carment and Rowlands 1998; Regan 2000). To pretend that these factors do not matter would prove foolhardy. But substantial recent evidence indicates that third-party political and strategic objectives are also

powerful determinants of intervention decisions. Interventions occur to combat and drain the resources of rivalries, for example, especially if a rival has already intervened into the civil war (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007; Fordham 2008). The U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War likely explains many of these interstate-rivalry interventions (Feste 1992; Scott 1996; Yoon 1997; Regan 2000; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008).

Other political and strategic factors may be no less important. Democracies intervene abroad to protect their own interests (Peceny 1999), major powers and those with a colonial past also tend to intervene more often (Lemke and Regan 2004), and there is some evidence that interventions occur because of alliances (Smith 1996; Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006). More generally, third parties carefully weigh a host of costs and benefits, including the conflict's intensity, duration, success prospects, potential spillover, and electoral consequences that accrue from international, national, and subnational sources in deciding to intervene (Regan 2000; Pickering 2001; Regan 2002; Saideman 1997, Kathman 2010; Enterline, Garrison, and Aubone 2009).

In spite of growing evidence about third-party motivations, existing studies are conspicuously devoid of economic arguments. Fordham (2008) argues that early work offered some evidence about the importance of economic factors (Odell 1974; Rosen 1974), but subsequent research showed that the strategic factors were more important (Meernik 1994; Pearson and Baumann 1977; Yoon 1997). Fordham (2008) examines the effects of economic interests (operationalized as exports) on U.S. interventions and finds an indirect effect through the formation of alliances. In a study on historical interventions, Aydin (2010) included economic factors, such as diamonds, gemstones, opiates, and oil as control variables, but did not emphasize them theoretically or empirically. Outside of these few studies, almost no recent work has considered economic motives for civil war intervention in a systematic way.

The neglect of economic factors is partly due to a shift in identifying and incorporating the side on which third parties intervene – the government vs. the opposition (Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008). Economic variables, such as trade, do not easily differentiate the separate economic stakes or consequences for government and rebels. Because governments and rebels vie for control of lootable natural resources, and some data exist about who controls them, we consider the effect of competing interventions on different sides of a conflict.

The dialogue on lootable resources and civil war tends to focus on the onset and duration of war, with only peripheral mention of how resources might affect third-party intervention (Ross 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Humphreys 2005). This topic has not been explored in any depth theoretically, and no systematic empirical tests have been conducted to determine whether lootable resources motivate third-party intervention.² And yet the presence of lootable natural resources may provide strong incentives for third parties to enter a conflict, which we now consider in greater depth.

Lootable Resources as a Motive for Intervention

The ‘lootability’ of resources refers generally to resources that have high value but where the market poses low barriers to entry (Le Billon 2001; Snyder 2003; Ross 2004; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). In the study of civil war onset and duration, most emphasis has been placed on diamonds (especially alluvial), along with some other resources, such as drugs and timber. A state’s supply of lootable natural resources presents an opportunity for third parties to intervene to profit from the resources. Non-lootable resources would be difficult to extract or support covertly, thus it is likely that third parties pay closer attention to lootable resources. But how specifically do lootable resources motivate intervention?

² Ross (2004b: 57) discusses the role of third parties briefly, but explicitly refers to the possibility as an “unanticipated mechanism”. Humphreys (2005: 511,517) discusses “greedy outsider” and “international conflict premium” mechanisms, but statistically models only the onset and duration of war, rather than third-party decisions to intervene.

A third party may intervene to gain or maintain access to the extraction of a raw resource or to a market for the resource (Humphreys 2005). Whether a state (1) had no previous access to the resources, (2) loses access at some point during the war, or (3) fears losing access because of war-related events, a third party may choose to intervene in order to protect its interests in the resources or gain access before others do. Clearly there is a time element at play: the longer a war progresses, the more likely it is that resource access will be obstructed or another party will access them first, thus prompting third parties to be proactive about their interest in the resources.

Because lootable resources carry such high value and opening or continuing their flows is so profitable, third parties may be more apt to intervene in a timely fashion to benefit. A third-party state may use the revenues generated from the resources for a variety of purposes. It may even extract the resource revenues to be used for a variety of private and public activities unrelated to the war. To be sure, domestic combatants are not passive actors merely at the will of third parties. At times, domestic combatants may oppose outside involvement. But as numerous examples including the D.R.C. indicate, third parties frequently pursue their own agendas regardless. Such alternative agendas are by no means anomalous (Cunningham 2010), but can nonetheless be beneficial to domestic combatants as support arrives.

A third party might also use revenues to fund the intervention itself and fuel the civil war towards a certain outcome beneficial to the third party. The benefit of the resources could cover the costs of intervention fully, or the resources might only partially offset costs, but in conjunction with other benefits, justify intervention. In the D.R.C. conflict of the late 1990s, it appears that Uganda's intervention reflects the non-war related motives, whereas Rwanda may have used the acquired resources primarily for fueling the war (Ross 2004b). This leads to our first hypothesis:

H1: Third parties have a higher hazard of intervention into civil wars if lootable resources are present in the country and conflict zones.

Thus far, we have primarily considered how resources might motivate intervention into a war without specifying which side a third party is likely to support. This decision likely depends on a number of factors, such as ethnic affinities, relations between the intervener and civil war state, the involvement of other third parties, but also in our case: who controls the resources. Thus, while the presence of a resource should entice third parties to intervene, government or rebel control of the resources is likely a crucial consideration for the side on which intervention will occur.

Third parties hoping for a rebel victory or advantage face a dilemma: international norms of sovereignty place an immediate barrier in the way of those hoping to support opposition groups. Clearly, opposition-biased interventions have occurred with some frequency, but they require much more justification or secrecy as they violate the international respect for state sovereignty. Opposition-biased interventions, therefore, often occur at least semi-covertly so as to avoid or reduce international scrutiny, as the U.S. intervention into 1980s Afghanistan nicely illustrates.

It follows that if third parties need to support the opposition side stealthily, then they may wish to minimize the use of their own military resources and instead rely on revenues that accrue to rebels from lootable resources. Indeed, third parties likely recognize that they can support opposition groups more easily if they can fuel the lootable resource market and generate revenues for the war that way. The third party itself could benefit from the revenues, of course, but perhaps more importantly the revenue from the resources can confer additive capability on the opposition side. U.S. involvement in the Afghan war appears to have followed this pattern as the U.S. helped fuel the opium trade in order to fund the Mujahidin.

If rebels have access to lootable resources, furthermore, there is much less of an incentive for third parties to support the government side. If rebels control resources, then outside interveners face a more difficult challenge backing a government against an otherwise stronger opponent. The rebels in such a situation will have greater capabilities and may be more difficult to defeat in the war. This discussion motivates our second hypothesis regarding the side on which intervention should occur:

H2: Third parties have a higher (lower) hazard of intervention on the opposition (government) side, if opposition groups have access to lootable resources.

We now turn to statistical tests and case study evidence to test these expectations.

Research Design

To understand the relationship between lootable resources and third party intervention, we consider both statistical and case study evidence. We use statistical analysis to capture the resource-intervention relationship based on post-WWII civil wars from Regan (2002), the most comprehensive database of civil war interventions. Alongside the statistical evidence, we consider a number of case examples that help substantiate and contextualize the quantitative results.

The dependent variable used to test Hypothesis 1 is the occurrence of intervention into a civil war, coded dichotomously as 1 if a third party intervenes and 0 if it does not, based on Regan (2002). The data also differentiate between intervention on the side of the government and intervention on the side of the opposition; we use that information, coded 1 for intervention on a side and 0 otherwise (for each of the sides), to test Hypothesis 2. The unit of analysis is the potential intervener, which we operationalize as any member of the international system other than the state involved in civil war (Lemke and Regan 2004). Rather than use cross-sectional information only, our approach captures each phase of the war wherein potential interveners are coded as having new

opportunities to intervene following instances of intervention by other states, which captures the actual process and evolution of the war more accurately. Using the potential intervener as the unit of analysis is the most suitable way to examine the intervener's decision-making process directly (Findley and Teo 2006, 830), rather than only examining generally whether the probability of intervention is increased given the presence of certain contextual factors (e.g., Regan 2000, 52; Aydin 2010).

The set of *all* potential interveners creates an unreasonably large number of observations, of which many states are not likely to intervene. Thus, we need a means to separate out states that are likely to be interveners from those that are not. While we could accomplish this through some case selection rules, similar to identifying politically relevant dyads in studies of interstate war, we instead use an estimation technique that accounts for the selection of likely interveners in the first stage of the model, followed by the occurrence of actual interventions, which is the key outcome of interest. Given the intervener selection issue and because the hypotheses posit expectations about duration until intervention, we use a split-population, or mixture-cure, survival model (Schmidt and Witte 1989; Sposto 2002).

The split-population model estimates the relationship between resources and intervention in two stages. It first estimates the likelihood that a state will intervene at some point during the war. In other words, the model estimates statistically whether a given state is the type that would intervene into a war or has particular incentives to get involved. Then, for the set of potential interveners likely to get involved, the model provides corrected estimates of the duration until the intervention occurs. Thus, the model allows us to use all of the information in the data weighted towards those most likely to intervene without artificially inflating the number of observations.³ (For political science

³ By using the split-population, or mixture (cure) approach, this allows us to include information about all interventions. Using some other case selection device, such as politically relevant dyads (Bennett and Stam 2000), would drop some subset of the actual interventions that occur.

applications, see: Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels 2005; Hettinger and Zorn 2005; Findley and Teo 2006; Svolik 2008.)

Potential interveners begin to be at risk of failure (intervention) upon the onset of civil war and continue at risk until they either intervene or the conflict ends. If the conflict ends before some interventions have occurred, then those observations are right-censored. We use a model that allows for repeated failures (multiple interventions). Each potential intervener thus has new opportunities to intervene following an intervention by a different state, but multiple interventions by the same state are not considered. As interventions occur at irregular intervals, we use a continuous-time setup.

We begin by estimating a split population model of the hazard of intervention into the war on any side. Following, we consider a competing risks model, which allows us to estimate the effect of intervention on one side of the conflict where nonintervention and intervention on the other side of the conflict are jointly the reference categories. Figure 1 depicts the baseline hazards for intervention generally, intervention on the side of the government, and intervention on the side of the opposition. The shape of each of the baseline hazards indicates that a lognormal distribution is most suitable (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

We consider two main independent variables capturing lootable natural resources. First, to evaluate Hypothesis 1, we use a measure of lootable resources from Lujala (2010:18-19), which captures easily extractable diamonds as well as gems, such as rubies, sapphires, and opals that are located in the conflict zone during the conflict. Further, we then consider an alternative, which captures all diamonds and gems but also includes drugs located in conflict zones. The Lujala (2010) data is by far the most comprehensive and thus appropriate for testing H1. But unfortunately it does not contain information about which side controls the lootable resources.

To account for the control of resources and test Hypothesis 2, we use the Fearon (2004) measure of contraband that captures “evidence of major reliance by the rebels on income from production or trafficking in contraband” (Fearon 2004: 284). His contraband measure consists specifically of lootable natural resources, such as precious gems, cocaine, and opium (284).⁴ This measure allows us to consider whether rebel control of resources encourages intervention on behalf of the rebels and discourages intervention on behalf of the government.

We use a set of control variables that capture existing arguments about geopolitical factors that might motivate third-party intervention (Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007). The specific control variables include contiguity (Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman 2002), colonial history (Hensel 1999), major power status (COW), cold war (if conflict started prior to 1989), similar region (COW), capability ratio (Singer 1987), joint democracy (Marshall and Jagers 2004), ethnic or ideological wars (Regan 2002), fatalities (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005), refugees (Moore and Shellman 2004), rivals and alliances with the civil war country (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006; Gibler and Sarkees 2004), and rivals and alliances with other interveners (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). We now consider whether the lootable resource measures are statistically significant predictors of decisions to intervene even after controlling for prominent geopolitical explanations.

Empirical Results

We first consider whether lootable resources motivate third-party intervention on the government or opposition side, a test of Hypothesis 1. Table 1 displays these findings for both the likelihood and

⁴ These two measure correlate at 0.4734, indicating that they are capturing much of the same thing. Notably, Lujala’s measure appears to have somewhat better coverage than Fearon’s. To match these two datasets with Regan’s, in some cases we collapsed the number of interventions in a country and assumed that if there were any interventions in a given country and year, then they belonged to a Regan conflict. Given that we still restrict the data to a given country and year, this eliminates any problem in the vast number of cases.

duration portions of the split-population model. The likelihood portion serves the primary role of sorting the potential interveners into those likely to intervene from those that are unlikely to do so. As the likelihood portion is used primarily as a sorting mechanism, we do not discuss the results of that stage at length here. Instead, the duration results are of greater interest as they address the hypothesis of what increases the hazard of intervention; stated differently, they indicate what decreases the time until intervention.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The results in Table 1, which rely on the Lujala (2010) measure, show that the presence of lootable resources in the conflict zone hastens the time until intervention. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant ($\beta=1.526$; $p=0.01$) and, substantively, there is a 65% increase in the predicted hazards. The first model (M1) includes only diamonds and gemstones and is clearly related strongly to intervention. Ideally, we would also like to consider other types of lootable resources. We thus add a measure of drugs in conflict zones to the measure of diamonds and gemstones and re-estimate the model (M2). Doing so indicates that drugs, diamonds, and gems all appear to serve a similar purpose in increasing the risk or decreasing the duration until intervention. While the effect attenuates slightly, the coefficient is again positive ($\beta=1.389$) and statistically significant ($p=0.017$).

These results are insightful and point to a connection between resources and intervention. We next turn to models that allow a better differentiation between who controls resources and on which side intervention is likely to occur in each such case. Table 2 displays the results using the measure of whether rebels control resources (Fearon 2004), and it provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 2.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

The expectation in Hypothesis 2 is that when rebels control resources, the hazard of intervention on the side of the opposition should increase, thus decreasing the time until intervention. Further, the hazard of intervention on the side of the government should decrease, thus taking longer for intervention to occur. The results across these two models show that the presence of natural resources hastens third-party intervention on the side of the opposition ($\beta = 1.869$; $p = 0.049$). On the flip side, when rebels control resources, this delays intervention on the side of the government ($\beta = -2.383$; $p = 0.012$). In both cases, the results are also substantively meaningful. Rebel control of lootable resources increases the predicted hazard of opposition intervention by 88%, whereas it decreases the predicted hazard of government intervention by 50%.

In addition to the split-population models, we simplified the estimation to check the robustness of the model. Rather than rely on a duration model, we estimated a set of rare-events logit models of intervention on any side, on the opposition side, and on the government side. Although this represents a deviation from the duration framework that is most appropriate for our research question, we note that the results are similarly robust. All additional models indicate positive and statistically significant relationships between lootable resources and third-party intervention.

Taken together, the results of the various statistical models offer strong support for the hypotheses that lootable resources motivate intervention into civil wars. While the results are insightful in establishing a general relationship, they cannot sort out competing mechanisms, such as whether third parties intervene to access resource markets or whether they use the resources strictly for fueling the war towards a desired end. To contextualize the results better, we investigated interventions into civil wars that appear to be connected to resources to trace how specifically the resources motivated the intervention, including discussing cases in which no resource-intervention relationship can be found.

Contextualizing the Statistical Results

In the theoretical section, we identified several ways that lootable resources could motivate intervention. They include third- party desires to access raw natural resources or the markets to those resources for purposes of profit.⁵ Alternatively, interveners may choose to get involved when rebels control resources because the resources confer additive strength on rebels, thus ameliorating the costs that third parties must bear. A closer look at individual cases indicates that a combination of these factors motivates intervention in a variety of cases. And in line with the statistical results, clearly not all wars with lootable resources motivate or are tied to intervention.

In a number of cases, third parties intervened because they desired access to the resources themselves or to the revenues generated through the resource markets. The D.R.C. is the best example of this connection with a number of third parties intervening into the D.R.C. to access natural resources. The UCDP Database cites five periods of internal conflict within the D.R.C., between 1960 to the present, and during these occasions several countries including the Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, the United States, Belgium, Sudan, and France sent troops or otherwise supported combatants (Uppsala 2008).

Diamonds, gold, coltan, copper, cobalt, timber, uranium, oil, precious gems, and narcotics are among the D.R.C.'s immense natural resource wealth. At various times during the protracted conflict, there is evidence that Belgium, Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Rwanda were resource-motivated (Uppsala 2008; Clark 2001; Global Witness 2009). Belgium even encouraged the secession

⁵ An investigation of how third parties use resource revenues is an interesting question, but is beyond the scope of this paper. Herein, we only argue that third parties seek such profits for a variety of ends.

of Katanga in 1960 due to lootable resource interests in the area (Marcum 1961). (French and Zimbabwean involvement, in particular, occurred when the government of what is now the D.R.C. offered France secure access to mines and Zimbabwe secure access to timber in exchange for military aid.)

As noted at the paper's outset, diamonds, timber, and gold also motivated Rwandan and Ugandan intervention in the conflicts of 1996-97 and 1998-2003 (Fearon 2002; Ross 2004a; Nest et al. 2006; Montague and Berrigan 2001; Clark 2001). These two states trained and armed rebels in exchange for the ability to exploit natural mineral deposits. Uganda, Rwanda, and the Congo all exported diamonds even though none of these countries had local diamond resources (Nest et al. 2006, 11; Global Witness 2009).⁶

D.R.C. is not the only example of this theoretical connection. Third parties intervened into both Senegal and Sierra Leone to obtain revenues from timbers and diamonds. Senegal's lootable resources include not only tropical timbers, but also timber products such as palm oil, wine, and cannabis (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005: 252). The internal war in Senegal lasted for nearly twenty years (1984-2003), and during this period six countries intervened: Guinea-Bissau, the Gambia, Iraq, Libya, the US, and France (Uppsala 2008). Evidence indicates that the Gambia was motivated by illegal trade with Senegal and benefitted through this trade. It is interesting to note that Gambia actually switched sides in the Senegalese conflict to correlate with the government's loss of control over the timber market. Thus, the timber that once supported the government's military endeavors now enabled Senegalese rebels to continue thriving with direct Gambian support (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005: 286).

⁶ In the private sector, furthermore, one US company, American Mineral Fields, struck a mining deal with the DRC in May of 1997, which ensured the company exclusive rights to copper and cobalt (Montague and Berrigan 2001).

Sierra Leone is another well-known conflict in which resources were integral to the war dynamics. Of all of the countries that intervened, including Liberia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, the UK, the US, Guinea, and the UN, diamonds certainly motivated Liberia's intervention (von Berneuth 2000). In fact, Liberia's president Charles Taylor helped Foday Sankoh (from Sierra Leone) to organize the rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which invaded Sierra Leone to start this civil war (Foday Sankoh 2003).⁷ According to Alex Yearsley, from Global Witness, Liberia trained and armed RUF forces and then "pushed [them] through into Sierra Leone solely to get the diamonds for Liberia. It is a case of: 'We'll support you to take over the country, and in return you get us the diamonds'" (Durham 2001).

In return for diamonds, Liberia illegally traded arms and other supplies with Sierra Leone's rebel group, RUF. In addition to Liberia's resource-motivated intervention, there is evidence that the South African company Executive Outcomes (EO) aided Sierra Leone's government in exchange for control over a local diamond operation (von Berneuth 2000). The diamonds thus motivated countries, businesses, and even terrorist groups to intervene to protect their economic interests.

The Angolan civil war (1975-1991) provides some evidence in favor of the argument that alluvial diamonds helped fund the rebels, which made intervention more attractive. South Africa, the United States, the DRC, and the Congo supported the rebels (UNITA), and Cuba, Namibia, the Soviet Union, Nigeria and Mozambique all directly or indirectly supported the government (Regan 2000; Fearon 2002; Akiba 1998, 104). It is unclear to what extent most parties were interested in the diamonds, but evidence suggests that both D.R.C. and Congo intervened into Angola partially for

⁷ Thus, technically this is a case of intervention prior to the beginning of a war, but nonetheless reflects third-party incentives to obtain resources.

economic reasons, consisting of the lootable resource revenues along with access to Angola's oil (Furley 2001: 96).⁸

Several cases indicate that resources motivated intervention because they provided ways for third parties to fund the combatants involved and thus increased the chances for victory. In Afghanistan from 1978-1989, Pakistan, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Saudi Arabia all intervened (Regan 2002), and some evidence suggests that they acted in response to the opium (Rubin 2000), which was a source of revenue for the Mujahadeen. In particular, the U.S. supported the opium trade as it provided a way to continue involvement without over-committing the U.S. military (Uppsala 2008; Bagley Jr. 2004; Burrough 2009).

As the statistical results indicate, not all wars having lootable resources attracted intervention. In Burma, where a rich endowment of gems, opium, coca, and timber exists, it appears that only timber had a weak connection to intervention. Private Chinese citizens purchased "lucky" Ye-Htin-Shu trees from the rebels to support the cause, and the war resulted in increased drug production by rebel groups, but there does not appear to be any evidence linking resources to state interventions (Ross 2004a; Sam 2007). In Indonesia, the results are similarly inconclusive with Malaysian businesses getting involved and profiting from the timber industry, though no third-party state intervention appears to have occurred for resources.

In the cases of Cambodia, India, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Turkey, there is little evidence linking resources and intervention. We could not find any evidence linking interventions into Cambodia (by Vietnam, U.S.S.R., and China) to its timber and gem resources. The same conclusion appears to apply in the case of India, in which its supply of alluvial diamonds and timber (Snyder 2006), likely did not attract intervention, although oil and natural gas may have (Uppsala 2008).

⁸ Angola's government also used diamond concessions to hire a professional military company from South Africa, Executive Outcomes (EO) to support them (Campbell 2002). The rebels also used their diamond money to purchase arms from Europe, specifically from Bulgaria (Harden 2000).

Control over water sources may have also encouraged Pakistan to aid insurgent movements in the Indian provinces of Jammu and Kashmir (Sahni 2006). In Liberia, too whose supply of diamonds is not extensive, there does not appear to be evidence that resources motivate intervention directly. Liberia's support for the RUF in Sierra Leone, partially to obtain diamonds, may have caused a reactionary intervention by Sierra Leone into Liberia, however. Nicaragua's coca and timber resources do not appear to have motivated or been a consideration for Soviet or American interventions in the 1980s. Finally, we could not identify any evidence of resource-motivated intervention into Turkey's civil war.

Evidence from Colombia and Peru is somewhat ambiguous and adds an unanticipated twist into the results. In both cases, it appears that third parties did not intervene to profit from the resources or to fuel the wars (Ross 2003; 2004), although resources may have motivated Venezuelan support (Forero 2009; Halvorssen 2008; Romero 2009). It is possible, however, that intervention occurred on the government side to curtail the production and flow of the drugs. The U.S. interventions on the side of the government may have been motivated, at least in part, by the need to offset the capability that the rebels gained through drug production and trafficking (Bagley 2001; Shifter 1999). Thus, drugs may have been an important motive for U.S. intervention, but in ways apart from those outlined above.

Conclusion

Do lootable natural resources motivate third-party intervention into civil wars? We began by arguing that economic factors of strategic interest to third parties could be an important determinant of third-party intervention. Potential interveners find lootable resources attractive for a number of reasons including access to the resources and associated revenues for private and public reasons. Moreover, potential interveners may see the resources as key to the dynamics and outcome of the

war wherein rebel groups that have access to lootable resources may have an added measure of strength with which to counter the government.

Because of the role that lootable resources can play and their attractiveness to a variety of states, we posited that third parties should intervene more readily in conflicts. And we further argued that they should intervene more quickly on the opposition side but less quickly on the government side when rebel groups control lootable resources. We then subjected these propositions to statistical tests using a split-population (mixture-cure) survival model, followed by some exploration of a number of individual cases.

The results of the analysis show that lootable resources indeed provide a powerful incentive for third-party intervention, even after controlling for other political and strategic factors, thus underscoring the importance of economic motives for intervention. The results across all of the models are statistically significant and, furthermore, are substantively nontrivial. Evidence from a number of cases offers insights into the different mechanisms underlying the resource-intervention relationship.

The implications of these results are noteworthy. If rebels have access to some sort of lootable resource, the evidence suggests that these wars are more likely to expand. Thus, analysts or policymakers seeking to explain or predict the expansion of civil wars should recognize that lootable resources provide incentives that are sufficiently attractive to third parties considering whether or not to intervene.

References

- Akcinaroglu, Seden, and Elizabeth Radziszewski. 2005. "Expectations, Rivalry and Civil War Duration." *International Interactions* 31: 349-374.
- Akiba, Okon. 1998. *Nigerian Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Continuity and Change*. New York: Peter Lang
- Aydin, Aysegul. 2010. "Where Do States Go? Strategy in Civil War Intervention." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27(1): 47-66.
- Baines, Taylor. 2001. "When Crime Pays: West African Leaders' Brutality Reaps Rewards." *Global Policy Forum*. 1 February. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/165/29454.html>>. [Accessed 12/17/2009].
- Bagley, Bruce Michael. 2001. "Drug Trafficking, Political Violence, and US Policy in Colombia in the 1990s." University of Miami. 5 January. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www.as.miami.edu/international-studies/faculty/BruceBagley>>. [Accessed 20/6/2011].
- Bagley Jr., Lieutenant Colonel Hubert E. 2004. "Afghanistan: Opium Cultivation and its Impact on Reconstruction." USAWC Strategy Research Project. US Army War College.
- Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, and Andrew Enterline. 2000. "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 44(4): 615-642.
- Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, Andrew Enterline, and Kyle Joyce. 2008. "Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process." *Journal of Peace Research* 45(3): 345-363.
- Bennett, D. Scott. and Allan C. Stam. 2000. "Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads: When Decisions Matter." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(5): 653-685.
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Bradford S. Jones. 2004. *Event-History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Peter Radcliffe, and Brandon L. Bartels. 2005. "The Incidence and Timing of PAC Contributions to Incumbent U.S. House Members, 1993-94." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30: 549-79.
- Burrough, Mark A. 2009. "A Historical Case of US Strategy Towards Afghanistan." UCAWC Strategy Research Project. US Army War College.

Campbell, Greg. 2002. *Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World's Most Precious Stones*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. P. 251.

Carment, David, Patrick James, and Dane Rowlands. 1997. "Ethnic Conflict and Third Party Intervention: Riskiness, Rationality, and Commitment." In *Enforcing Cooperation* Eds. Gerald Schneider and Patrick Weitsman. London: Macmillan. Pp. 104-131.

Carment, David, and Dane Rowlands. 1998. "Three's Company: Evaluating Third Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(5): 572-599.

"Chronology for Hazaras in Afghanistan." 2007. *Minorities at Risk Project*. Center for International Development and Conflict Management--University of Maryland. 10 January. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=70001>>. [Accessed 2/22/2008].

"Chronology for Indigenous Peoples in Nicaragua." 2007. *Minorities at Risk Project*. Center for International Development and Conflict Management--University of Maryland. 10 January. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=9302>>. Accessed 12/17/2009.

Clark, John F. 2001. "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Interpretations." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39(2): 261-287.

"Colombia: Chavez Funding FARC Rebels." 2008. *USA Today*. 4 March. Internet on-line. Available at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-03-02-venezuelacolombia_N.htm>. [Accessed 12/17/2009].

Cunningham, David. 2010. "Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 115-127.

Durham, Dick. 2001. "Diamond Trade Fuels Bloody Wars." *CNN.com*. 18 January. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www.cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/africa/01/18/diamonds.overview/index.html>>. [Accessed 12/17/2009].

Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Nicholas Sambanis 2000. 'External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars.' *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2433*.

Enterline, Andrew J., Steve R. Garrison, and Amber Aubone. 2009. "To Live & Let Die? Democratic Third Parties & the Cost-Benefit Feedback from Intervention into Intrastate Conflicts." Unpublished Manuscript: University of North Texas.

"Faced With a Gun, What Can You Do? War and the Militarization of Mining in Eastern Congo." 2009. *Global Witness*. July.

Fearon, James D. 2004. "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 275-302.

- Feste, Karen. 1992. *Expanding the Frontiers: Superpower Intervention in the Cold War*. New York: Praeger.
- Findley, Michael G., and Tze Kwang Teo. 2006. "Rethinking Third-Party Interventions Into Civil Wars: An Actor Centric Approach." *The Journal of Politics* 68(4): 828-837.
- "Foday Sankoh." 2003. *The Economist*. 7 August. Internet on-line. Available at <http://www.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=1974062&source=login_payBarrier>. [Accessed 12/17/2009]
- Fordham, Benjamin. 2008. "Power or Plenty? Economic Interests, Security Concerns, and American Intervention." *International Studies Quarterly* 52(4): 737-758.
- Forero, Juan. 2009. "Venezuela's Drug-Trafficking Role is Growing Fast, U.S. Report Says." *The Washington Post*. 19 July. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/18/AR2009071801785.html>>. [Accessed 12/17/2009]
- Furley, Oliver, and Roy May (Eds.). 2001. *African Interventionist States*. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing. P. 266.
- Gberie, Lansana. 2005. *A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. P. 224.
- Gent, Stephen E. 2007. "Strange Bedfellows: The Strategic Dynamics of Major Power Military Interventions." *The Journal of Politics* 69(4): 1089-1102.
- Halvorsen, Thor. 2008. "Venezuela's charades; Chavez and other leaders sugar-coat FARC." *The Washington Times*. 7 February.
- Hanson, Stephanie. 2009. "FARC, ELN: Colombia's Left-Wing Guerrillas." *Council on Foreign Relations*. 19 August. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www.cfr.org/publication/9272/>>. [Accessed 12/17/2009]
- Harden, Blaine. 2000. "Diamond Wars: A Special Report; Africa's Gems: Warfare's Best Friend." *The New York Times*. 6 April. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/06/world/diamond-wars-a-special-report-africa-s-gems-warfare-s-best-friend.html?sec=&spn=&pagewanted=1>>. [2/22/2008].
- Hensel, Paul. 1999. Issue Correlates of War Colonial History Data. Available at <http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/icowdata.html#colonies> . [Accessed 11/22/2005]
- Hettinger, Virginia A., and Christopher Zorn. 2005. "Explaining the Incidence and Timing of Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30: 5-28.
- Hofstatter, Benjamin. 2001. "Liberia: Trade, Environment, and Conflict." *Inventory of Conflict and Environment Cases*. The Mandala Projects. American University, School of International Service. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/liberia-diamonds.htm>>. [Accessed 12/17/2009].

Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 508-537.

Humphreys, Macartan, and Habaye Ag Mohamed. 2005. "Senegal and Mali: A Comparative Study of Rebellions in West Africa." In Nicholas Sambanis and Paul Collier (Eds.), *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*. Chp. 9. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Kathman, Jacob. 2010. "Civil War Contagion and Neighboring Interventions." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(4): 989-1012.

Le Billon, Philippe. 2001. "The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict." *Political Geography* 20(5): 561-584.

Lemke, Douglas, and Patrick Regan. 2004. "Interventions as Influence." In *The Scourge of War: New Extensions on an Old Problem*, Ed. Paul F. Diehl. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 145-168.

Licklider, Roy. 1993. *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*. New York: New York University Press.

Licklider, Roy. 1995. "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993." *American Political Science Review* 89: 681-690.

Lujala, Päivi. 2009. "Deadly Combat Over Natural Resources." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(1): 50-71.

Lujala, Päivi. 2010. "The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Reel Access to Natural Resources." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(1): 15-28.

Marcum, John A. 1961. "Unilateral Intervention in the Congo and its Political Consequences." *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting* 55: 27-30.

Montague, Dena, and Frida Berrigan. 2001. "Dollars and Sense – The Business of War in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Who Benefits?" *Arms Trade Resource Center--World Policy Institute*. July/August. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/news/dollarsandsense.html>>. [Accessed 2/22/2008].

Mullenbach, Mark, and Gerard Matthews. 2008. "Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes." *International Interactions* 34(1): 25-52.

"Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo 1993 to 2003." 2009. *Global Witness*. December.

Nest, Michael Wallace, Francois Grignon, and Emizet F. Kisangani. 2006. *The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. P. 165.

Odell, John S. 1974. "Correlates of U.S. Military Assistance and Military Intervention." In *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism*, Eds. Stephen J. Rosen, and James R. Kurth. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 143–161.

"Geographical and Resource Datasets--Diamond Resources." 2007. PRIO--Centre for the Study of Civil War. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Geographical-and-Resource/Diamond-Resources/>>. [Accessed 2/22/2008].

Peceny, Mark. 1999. *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets*. University Park, Pennsylvania : Pennsylvania State University Press.

Regan, Patrick, M. 1996. "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Interventions in Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(2): 336-359.

Regan, Patrick, M. 1998. "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts." *Journal of Politics* 60(3): 754-779.

Regan, Patrick M. 2000. *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention and Interstate Conflict*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.

Regan, Patrick, M. 2002. "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 55-73.

Romero, Simon. 2009. "Evidence Shows Venezuelan Aid To Rebel Group." *The New York Times*. 3 August.

Rosen, Stephen J. 1974. "The Open Door Imperative and U.S. Foreign Policy." In *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism*, Eds. Stephen J. Rosen, and James R. Kurth. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 117–142.

Ross, Michael L. 2003. "Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil War." In Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (Eds.) *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict--Beyond Greed and Grievance*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. P. 47-70.

Ross, Michael L. 2004a. "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 337-356.

Ross, Michael L. 2004b. "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence From Thirteen Cases." *International Organization* 58(1): 35-67.

Rubin, Barnett R. 2000. "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan." *Center on International Cooperation*. New York University. 25 September. Internet on-line. Available at <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VC6-418PP1W-5&_user=456938&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=456938&md5=7213d6165e7b44f7adbe5a4244d832c8>. [Accessed 2/22/2008].

Sahni, Hamir K. 2006. "The Politics of Water in South Asia: The Case of the Indus Waters Treaty." *SAIS Review* 26(2): 153-165.

- Sam, Khun. 2007. "Getting to the Roots of Burma's Latest Timber Trade." *Global Policy Forum*. 18 June. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/198/40330.html>>. [Accessed 2/22/2008].
- Schmidt, P. and Witte, A. 1989. "Predicting Criminal Recidivism Using 'Split Population' Survival Time Models." *Journal of Econometrics* 40: 141-159.
- Scott, James. 1996. *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 2005. "Opium Gold Unites US Friends and Foes." *Asia Times Online*. 2 September. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://opiods.com/opium/golden-route.html>>. [Accessed 12/16/2009].
- Shifter, Michael. 1999. "Colombia on the Brink: There Goes the Neighborhood." *Foreign Affairs* 78(4): 14-20.
- Snyder, Richard. 2006. "Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder?" *Comparative Political Studies* 39(8): 943-968.
- Snyder, Richard, and Ravi Bhavnani. 2005. "Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 563-597.
- Sposto, Richard. 2002. "Cure Model Analysis in Cancer: An Application to Data from the Children's Cancer Group." *Statistics in Medicine* 21: 293-312.
- Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman. 2002. "The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19(2): 58-66.
- Svolik, Milan. 2008. "Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation." *American Political Science Review* 102(2): 153-168.
- Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 2008. *UCDP Database*. Uppsala University. Internet on-line. Available at <www.ucdp.uu.se/database>. [Accessed 11/22/2009].
- Von Berneuth, Carl. 2000. "Diamond Registry and Sierra Leone Civil War." *Inventory of Conflict and Environment Cases*. The Mandala Projects. American University, School of International Service. Internet on-line. Available at <<http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/diamond-sl.htm>>. [Accessed 12/17/2009].
- Willum, Gunnar. 2001. "Rebel Leader Confirms What Western Donors Deny: Uganda Plunders Congo." *Aktuelt* (Denmark). January 22. [Accessed 12/17/2009]
- Willum, Gunnar, and Bjørn Willum. 2000. "World Bank Awards Illegal Financing of Army: Uganda Encouraged to Pillage Congo." *Aktuelt* (Denmark). January 17-18. [Accessed 12/17/2009]

Yoon, Mi Yung. 1997. "Explaining US Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-1989." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(4): 580-602.




Figure 1: Estimated Baseline Hazards of Intervention with All Cases, Opposition Interventions, and Government Interventions

Covariate	M1: Intervention			M2: Intervention		
	(Diamonds/Gems)			(With Drugs)		
Probability (Logit)	β	S.E.	P	β	S.E.	P
Diamonds/Gems	0.402	0.368	0.137			
Diamonds/Gems/Drugs				0.053	0.369	0.443
Major Power	2.826	0.428	<0.001	2.866	0.438	<0.001
Colonial History	4.049	0.82	<0.001	4.06	0.858	<0.001
Cold War	1.538	0.328	<0.001	1.526	0.329	<0.001
Same Region	2.331	0.358	<0.001	2.359	0.363	<0.001
Contiguous State	3.524	0.403	<0.001	3.564	0.408	<0.001
Capability Ratio (Log)	1.259	0.173	<0.001	1.253	0.174	<0.001
Rivalry	2.197	0.665	<0.001	2.173	0.651	<0.001
Alliance	-0.534	0.458	0.122	-0.687	0.458	0.067
Ethnic Conflict	0.893	0.585	0.064	1.049	0.584	0.037
Ideology Conflict	0.63	0.603	0.148	0.936	0.597	0.059
Joint Democracy	-1.608	0.683	0.01	-1.545	0.679	0.012
Constant	-7.506	0.69	<0.001	-7.544	0.689	<0.001
Hazard (Lognormal)	$\tilde{\beta}$	S.E.	P	$\tilde{\beta}$	S.E.	P
Diamonds/Gems	1.526	0.657	0.01			
Diamonds/Gems/Drugs				1.389	0.655	0.017
Rivalry	0.73	0.695	0.147	0.817	0.701	0.122
Alliance	2.373	0.718	<0.001	2.381	0.722	<0.001
Ally w/other intervener	3.943	1.085	<0.001	3.921	1.075	<0.001
Rival w/other intervener	3.368	1.2	0.003	3.405	1.207	0.003
Fatalities (Log)	0.113	0.15	0.226	0.16	0.149	0.142
Forced Migrants (Log)	0.307	0.098	0.001	0.312	0.098	<0.001
Constant	-11.937	0.952	<0.001	-12.179	0.961	<0.001

Table 1: Split population model of intervention into civil wars using Lujala (2010) measures of Diamonds/Gems (M1) and Diamonds/Gems/Drugs (M2) where intervention on either side of the conflict is the outcome of interest.

Covariate	M3: Opposition Intervention			M4: Government Intervention		
	β	S.E.	<i>P</i>	β	S.E.	<i>P</i>
Probability (Logit)						
Loot. Rebel Financing	0.684	0.692	0.162	0.922	0.59	0.059
Major Power	1.859	0.629	0.002	3.091	0.495	<0.001
Colonial History	4.953	1.31	<0.001	2.796	0.926	0.002
Cold War	3.09	0.735	<0.001	0.937	0.377	0.007
Same Region	2.345	0.535	<0.001	1.851	0.398	<0.001
Contiguous State	4.821	0.654	<0.001	2.642	0.447	<0.001
Capability Ratio (Log)	1.449	0.265	<0.001	1.243	0.186	<0.001
Rivalry	3.673	0.947	<0.001	0.732	1.097	0.253
Alliance	-2.002	0.83	0.008	-0.358	0.485	0.231
Ethnic Conflict	2.021	1.073	0.03	0.98	0.677	0.074
Ideology Conflict	0.805	1.106	0.234	1.196	0.673	0.038
Joint Democracy	-3.037	1.271	0.009	-1.461	0.759	0.027
Constant	-10.3	1.452	<0.001	-7.159	0.797	<0.001
Hazard (Lognor)	$\tilde{\beta}$	S.E.	<i>P</i>	$\tilde{\beta}$	S.E.	<i>P</i>
Loot. Rebel Financing	1.869	1.128	0.049	-2.383	1.053	0.012
Rivalry	1.718	0.812	0.017	-1.892	1.251	0.065
Alliance	2.406	1.03	0.01	3.573	0.906	<0.001
Ally on Govt. Side	-3.416	2.042	0.047	4.929	1.294	<0.001
Ally on Opp. Side	1.142	1.787	0.262	1.028	1.302	0.215
Rival on Govt. Side	6.762	1.863	<0.001	-0.975	1.26	0.22
Rival on Opp. Side	0.219	1.718	0.45	4.646	1.756	0.004
Fatalities (Log)	0.107	0.174	0.27	0.203	0.165	0.11
Forced Migrants (Log)	0.164	0.123	0.092	0.349	0.115	0.001
Constant	-13.356	1.125	<0.001	-12.781	1.214	<0.001

Table 2: Split population model of intervention into civil wars using Fearon (2004) measure where intervention on the opposition side (M3) and the government side (M4) is the outcome of interest.